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A Provocative Defense
Aya Gruber*
It is common wisdom that the provocation defense is, quite
simply, sexist. For decades, there has been a trenchant feminist
critique that the doctrine reflects and reinforces masculine norms of
violence and shelters brutal domestic killers. The critique is so
prominent that it appears alongside the doctrine itself in leading
criminal law casebooks. The feminist critique of provocation
embodies several claims about provocation's problematically
gendered nature, including that the defense is steeped in chauvinist
history, treats culpable sexist killers too leniently, discriminates
against women, and expresses bad messages. This Article offers a
(likely provocative) defense of the provocation doctrine. While fully
acknowledging widespread gender inequity in society, the Article
argues that the feminist critique may overestimate the provocation
doctrine's contribution to such inequality and underestimateits value
to marginalized defendants. Provocation, like many legal doctrines,
has a complex history. Further, the limited empirical evidence
available appears to undermine rather than confirm assertions that
the defense disproportionately burdens women and proves
strategically vital to murderous men. Moreover, efforts to utilize
criminal punishment to express an anti-masculinity, anti-violence
message may, in the end, reinforce destructive masculine norms,
exacerbate racial hierarchies, justify extant unequal power
distributions, and, ironically, increase violence and suffering. In the
end, the Article cautions that the feminist critique ofprovocation and
similar progressive critiques of doctrinal leniency may
unintentionally instantiate and entrench the punitive impulses that
createand sustain mass incarceration.

Copyright C 2014 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of their
publications.
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INTRODUCTION

On July 3, 2013, the Supreme Court of California handed down a decision
that will likely appear in criminal law books and law review articles as the
exemplar of all that is wrong with the provocation, or heat-of-passion,
defense.' To students of provocation law, the facts of People v. Beltran are
disturbingly familiar, and critics will no doubt recount them in lurid detail as
confirmation that the defense must be abandoned. The male defendant, Tare

1.

People v. Beltran, 301 P.3d 1120 (Cal. 2013).
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Beltran, was a miscreant-a controlling, jealous, and vicious abuser.2 In his
less-than-two-year relationship with the decedent, Joyce Tempongko, Tare had
beaten Joyce several times, confined her in the apartment, and violated a
protection order.3 After Tare moved out of the apartment and shortly before her
death, Joyce began dating another man despite Tare's threat that "their
relationship would end over his dead body or hers." 4 Following several
harassing phone calls, Tare went over to Joyce's apartment and opened the
door with the key he had kept. The two argued. Tare then grabbed a large knife
from the kitchen and stabbed Joyce to death in front of her two small children.
Tare fled to Mexico, where he was arrested six years later. 6
At trial, Tare asserted Joyce provoked him into a state of passion, such
that the killing constituted voluntary manslaughter, not murder. According to
Tare, after Joyce hurled insults and expletives at him, he attempted to leave the
apartment. Joyce then yelled, "F-you. I was right. I knew you were going
to walk away someday. That's why I killed your bastard. I got an abortion."
Having believed that their past efforts to get pregnant were naturally
unsuccessful, Tare went into a shocked state and eventually found himself
standing in the living room holding a bloody knife.' The question before the
California Supreme Court was whether the trial judge committed reversible
error by initially instructing the jury that provocation can only serve as a legal
defense if a reasonable person would have killed under the same circumstances
(sometimes called "act reasonableness"). 9 The defense asserted that the judge
erred by implying that the defendant's act of killing had to be reasonable and
that adequate provocation exists simply when a reasonable person would have
been provoked to act rashly (sometimes called "emotion reasonableness"). 10
Siding with the defense, the California Supreme Court reaffirmed "the standard
for determining heat of passion that [it] adopted nearly a century ago," namely,

2. See id. at 1123-24 (observing that Tare had repeatedly physically abused the decedent,
threatened her, and ultimately stabbed her to death).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1124.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1127 (quoting the trial judge as stating: "In deciding whether the provocation was
sufficient, consider whether a person of average disposition would have been provoked and how such
a person would react in the same situation knowing the same facts"). See CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND
THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMI1NAL COURTROOM 262 (2003) (describing
"act reasonableness" as whether "a reasonable person in the defendant's shoes would have responded
or acted as violently as the defendant did").
10. Beltran, 301 P.3d at 1127 (stating that the correct question is not "whether an average
person would react physically and kill" but how he would "react[] mentally, experiencing obscured
reason"). See LEE, supra note 9, at 263 (defining "emotion reasonableness" as whether "the
defendant's emotional outrage orpassion was reasonable").
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"

that the provocation defense does not require a defendant's act of killing to be
reasonable.
One can hear the collective jeer from provocation critics everywhere.12
This case will undoubtedly add further fuel to what experts describe as a
formidable "feminist attack" on the provocation defense.1 3 The doctrine's
partial exoneration of certain enraged killers has been the subject of varied
theoretical and practical objections. 14 However, the law's apparent tendency to
privilege men and disadvantage women has emerged as the most salient
critique." Various analyses of provocation's gender problems (which this
paper refers to collectively as "the feminist critique" of provocation)1 6 figure
prominently in the voluntary manslaughter sections of leading criminal law
casebooks, and abundant scholarly commentary condemns the defense (or
broad formulations of it).' 7 The amicus brief filed in Beltran by the San

Francisco Domestic Violence Consortium et al. reads like a feminist
manifesto." Headings include Since Its Inception Hundreds Of Years Ago And
Continuing Up Until Today, The ProvocationDefense Has PerpetuatedGender
Biases And Sheltered Men Who Kill Their Intimate Partners; The Ultimate
Form Of Domestic Abuse Is Murder; and the perhaps not-so-strategicallysavvy, Calfornia courts-led by this one-have historically embraced
abusers' "blame-the-victim" rationalization.19 In coming to its defensefriendly conclusion, the California Supreme Court simply avoided commenting

11. Beltran, 301 P.3d at 1136.
12. See Lyanne Melendez, Justices to Decide Fate of Murder Suspect Tare Beltran,
ABC7NEWS.COM (Mar. 5, 2013, 7:15 PM), http://abc7news.com/archive/9017055/ (quoting Beverly
Upton, spokesperson for the San Francisco Domestic Violence Consortium, as stating that the defense
position is "concerning" because it "sends a message that domestic violence in itself is not as
serious").
13. Joshua Dressler, Wy Keep the ProvocationDefense?: Some Reflections on a Dificult
Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959, 961 (2002).
14. See infra Part I.
15. See Dressler, supra note 13, at 961 (calling the feminist critique the "[m]odern criticism of
provocation law"); see also JEREMY HORDER, PROVOCATION AND RESPONSIBILITY (1992) (finding
general support for the defense but advocating abolition after considering its gender implications).
16. The "feminist critique" referred to in this Article broadly includes all gender-based
objections to the provocation defense and not just those lodged by self-described feminists or those
otherwise connected up to a specific feminist theory. In fact, many of those who participate in the
"feminist" critique might not consider themselves feminist legal theorists at all or subscribe to any
particular school of feminism.
17. Casebooks featuring the issue prominently include JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 406-09 (4th ed. 2000); STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 288 (3d ed. 2008); CYNTHIA LEE & ANGELA HARRIS, CRIMINAL LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 388-91 (2005); JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL
LAW 290-92 (5th ed. 2009); See also infra note 21.
18. Application of San Francisco Domestic Violence Consortium et al. to File Amici Curiae
Brief in Support of the People of the State of California; and Amici Brief, People v. Beltran, 301 P.3d
1120 (Cal. 2013) (No. S192644), 2012 WL 1859371.
19. Id. at i-iii.
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on gender altogether. After all, what could it have said? Who could sympathize
with a man like Tare Beltran?
Indeed, the feminist critique of the provocation defense is so devastating
that few question the now common assertion that broad formulations of the
defense, and particularly the Model Penal Code's (MPC) expansive defense of
20
,21
extreme emotional disturbance (EED), are "anti-woman.
Critics make a
number of explicit and implicit claims about the specially gendered nature of
the defense. Some of these observations involve the chauvinistic history of the
22
doctrine. Other claims are empirical and concern the numbers and types of
offenders that the provocation defense serves.23 Many of the arguments
concern the messages expressed by the defense.24
These arguments combine to create a formidable opponent to provocation,
especially EED. The sound bite, "provocation is sexist," leads many to reject
the doctrine out of hand, regardless of its practical import.25 Those who favor
retention of the defense must always argue in the shadow of a presumption that
26
they are being anti-woman.
This Article picks up the gauntlet thrown down decades ago by genderconscious scholars and defends provocation against the specific arguments

20. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(l)(b) (1980) ("Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter
when . . [it] is committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which
there is reasonable explanation or excuse.").
21. See Brenda M. Baker, Provocationas a Defence for Abused Women Who Kill, 1 CAN. J.L.
& JURISPRUDENCE 193, 199 (1998) ("The conception of provocation as arousing reasonable or
warranted outrage is now considered an outdated and gender-biased idea which privileges male
anger."). See, e.g., Elisabeth McDonald, No Straight Answer: Homophobia as Both an Aggravating
and Mitigating Factorin New Zealand Homicide Cases, 37 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 223, 234
(2006) ("The provocation defense is sexist."); Fiona Sampson, Mandatory Minimum Sentences and
Women with Disabilities,39 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 589, 594 (2001) (observing "the sexist origins of the
defence and the discriminatory way in which the defence continues to be applied today"); Nikolette Y.
Clavel, Note, Righting the Wrong and Seeing Red: Heat of Passion, the Model Penal Code, and
Domestic Violence, 46 NEw ENG. L. REv. 329, 339 (2012) (noting the doctrine's "sexist beginnings in
property law and its continued accommodation toward primarily male defendants"); Deborah E.
Milgate, Note, The Flame Flickers, But Burns On: Modem JudicialApplication of the Ancient Heat of
Passion Defense, 51 RUTGERS L. REv. 193, 201 (1998) (observing the "obvious 'masculine' nature"
of provocation); Emily L. Miller, Comment, (Wo) manslaughter: Voluntary Manslaughter, Gender,
and the Model Penal Code, 50 EMORY L.J. 665, 667 (2001) (stating that provocation has "never been
a female-friendly doctrine"). One notable exception is Joshua Dressler, who devotes some time
defending provocation in the face of widespread belief that "[p]rovocation is a male-centered and
male-dominated defense." See Dressler,supra note 13, at 975-79.
22. See infra Part III.A.
23. See infra Part III.B & C.
24. See infra Part III.D.
25. See, e.g., Caroline Forell, Gender Equality, Social Values and Provocation Law in the
United States, Canada and Australia, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 27, 31 (2006)
[hereinafter GenderEquality] ("The origins of the provocation defense are deeply gendered."); Wendy
Keller, DisparateTreatment ofSpouse MurderDefendants, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 255,
263 (1996) ("[M]anslaughter is just an embodiment of men's excuses and experiences.").
26. See, e.g., Dressler, supra note 13, at 962 (hedging his defense of provocation with the
caveat that "feminist concerns regarding the defense deeply concern me").
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connecting the doctrine to sex inequality. 27 However, let me be clear about
what this Article does and does not defend. It does not defend violence against
women (or defendants like Tare Beltran), nor does it condone the gendered
social and cultural conditions precedent to gender violence. It fully
acknowledges widespread gender inequality and a "tolerated residuum" of
21
gender violence. It also does not simply assume that criminal defendants'
liberty interests generally trump women's interests in gender equality. While
consciously aware of the pervasive problem of male dominance in law and
society, this Article questions whether feminists are correct about the extent to
which the provocation defense is complicit in this state of affairs and the extent
to which its elimination will alleviate it. In other words, the feminist account
may underdescribe the provocation doctrine. Moreover, provocation's
problematically gendered nature, even if assumed, may underdetermine
proposals for its elimination or limitation.
Responding to the variegated arguments that form the feminist critique of
the provocation defense necessarily requires some scholarly excavation and
exegesis. Because different authors developed the critique over time, a
significant part of this project is devoted to distilling the arguments and
normative commitments underlying the critique. The remainder of the Article
consists of responses to the critique. The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I
introduces the provocation defense and briefly discusses general debates over
the heat-of-passion defense. Part II provides a short genealogy of the genderbased critique. Part III catalogues and describes the various claims constituting
the feminist critique of provocation. Finally, Part IV defends provocation in the
face of these powerful arguments.
I.
PROVOCATION FROM A GENDER NEUTRAL PERSPECTIVE

The provocation defense has a long history in Anglo-American law and is
the subject of many types of criticisms. Those who adhere to a tough-on-crime
philosophy decry the defense's leniency toward killers. 29 Legal psychologists
30
question the doctrine's assumptions about human emotion and loss of control.

27. See Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation
Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1342, 1389 (1997) ("Feminists' arguments about this defense have
fallen on deaf ears in large part because defenders of the EED formulation, or provocation in general,
do not have an intellectual method that will permit them to engage a claim of gender bias.").
28. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing, and the Eroticization of
Domination, in SEXY DRESSING ETC. 126, 137 (1993) (discussing the "tolerated residuum" of sexual
abuse in contemporary American society).
29. See Dressler, supra note 13, at 960 (stating that "[o]f course, one might expect law-andorder advocates to criticize a doctrine that can permit an intentional killer to avoid conviction for
murder").
30. See Donna K. Coker, Heat ofPassion and Wife Killing: Men ho Batter/Men ho Kill, 2
S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 71, 91-94 (1992) (discussing the false psychological assumption

about seemingly provoked men who kill); infra text accompanying notes 99-100.
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Penal theorists argue over the defense's relationship to appropriate
punishment. 3' Nevertheless, it is the gender critique that provocation reflects
and reinforces violent male domination of women that has proven nearly
universally persuasive. This Part will introduce provocation law and describe
general scholarly conflicts over the doctrine.
Writings explaining, categorizing, and dissecting the various formulations
of the provocation defense litter the legal scholarship landscape. 3 2 In brief, the
provocation defense, when successful, mitigates murder to voluntary
manslaughter.3 3 Such mitigation can mean the difference between life and
death or between a short sentence and perpetual incarceration.3 4 The idea
underlying the defense is that a provoked defendant acts without the "malice"
required for murder culpability.3 5 Consequently, the defense is not satisfied just
because a defendant subjectively felt passion when provoked.36 While passion
can reduce a first-degree premeditated murder to a second-degree murder,

31. See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
32.
Scholarship exhaustively discussing provocation includes, but is not limited to, Mitchell N.
Berman & Ian P. Farrell, ProvocationManslaughteras PartialJustification and PartialExcuse, 52

WM. & MARY L. REV. 1027, 1031 (2011); Aya Gruber, Murder, Minority Victims, and Mercy, 85 U.
COLO. L. REV. 129 (2014) [hereinafter Murder]. See generally HORDER, supra note 15; LEE, supra
note 9; SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY, JUDGING EVIL: RETHINKING THE LAW OF MURDER AND
MANSLAUGHTER (1998); Symposium, The Nature, Structure, and Function of Heat of
Passion/Provocationas a CriminalDefense, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1 (2009); A.J. Ashworth, The
Doctrine of Provocation, 35 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 292 (1976); Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat of
Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 422 (1982)
[hereinafter Rethinking Passion]; Stephen P. Garvey, Passion's Puzzle, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1677, 172729 (2005); Aya Gruber, Victim Wrongs: The Casefor a GeneralCriminalDefense Based on Wrongful

Victim Behavior in an Era of Victims'Rights, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 645, 652 (2003) [hereinafter Victim
Wrongs]; Camille A. Nelson, (En)raged or (En)gaged: The Implications of Racial Context to the
CanadianProvocationDefence, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1007 (2002).
33. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-2(a) (2014) (stating that provocation is "the result of a
sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such
passion in a reasonable person").
34. See Berman & Farrell, supra note 32, at 1107-1109 (listing states' respective sentences for
voluntary manslaughter and murder).

35.

See People v. Beltran, 301 P.3d 1120, 1125 (Cal. 2013) (noting that provocation

"precludes the formation of malice and reduces an unlawful killing from murder to manslaughter");
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 958 N.E.2d 518, 524 (Mass. 2011) (defining provocation as "a sudden
transport of passion or heat of blood . . without malice").

36.

See People v. Steele, 47 P.3d 225, 239-40 (Cal. 2002) (noting that 'The circumstances

giving rise to the heat of passion are viewed .. . objectively"); State v. Smith, 822 N.W.2d 401, 408
(Neb. 2012) (stating that whether there is reasonable provocation is "an objective" question);
Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 25 A.3d 277, 314 (Pa. 2011) (adopting an "objective test").
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something more is normatively required to reduce murder to manslaughter. 37
The passion must be triggered by "adequate provocation."3 8
There are a wide variety of approaches to defining adequate provocation,
ranging from narrow (good for prosecutors) to broad (good for defendants).39
Traditional provocation law confines the defense to categories of victim
behavior considered highly offensive in Tudor-era England namely, mutual
combat, sudden injury, false arrest, and adultery. 40 These bases for the defense,
also called the "nineteenth-century four," have been criticized on many
grounds, including being hopelessly outdated and overinclusive. 4 1 In the midto-late twentieth century, however, the largely progressive criminal law
professoriate characterized the list as underinclusive, disadvantaging
42
defendants who may have been provoked by other circumstances. As a result,
in the United States, states have all but abandoned the categorical approach for
a standard that permits more flexibility in determining what constitutes
*43
adequate provocation.
The majority of jurisdictions require that the alleged provoking act be
sufficient to arouse the passions of an "ordinary," "typical," or "reasonable"
37. However, certain states have adopted purely subjective diminished capacity defenses. See,
e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.020 (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-13 (West 2012); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 704-401 (LexisNexis 2012); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 38 (2006); Mo. REV. STAT. §§
552.015.2(8), 552.030(3) (2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-102 (2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-2
(West 2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305(1) (West 2014).
38. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103(A)(2) (2010) (defining defense as "heat of passion
resulting from adequate provocation by the victim"); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 203(1)(B) (2006)
("extreme anger or extreme fear brought about by adequate provocation"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1250(A) (West 2003) ("heat of sudden passion caused by adequate provocation"); TENN. CODE ANN. §
39-13-211(a) (West 2011) ("state of passion produced by adequate provocation").
39. See Nourse, supra note 27, at 1342 (observing that provocation's "two poles" are the broad
MPC formulation and the narrow categorical approach).
40. See infra Parts III.A., IV.A. (discussing provocation's history in English law); see
generally HORDER, supra note 15, at 1-43; Ashworth, supra note 32.
41. Nourse, supra note 27, at 1341 (calling the categories the "nineteenth century four"); see
HORDER, supra note 15, at 178 (asserting that equating "action in moments of unexpected anguish"
with reasonable action is a "sham"); Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive
Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591, 593-94, 636 (1981) (stating that jibes, assaults, or adultery
would never provoke an ordinary man to kill).
42. See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Wen "Heterosexual" Men Kill "Homosexual" Men:
Reflections on ProvocationLaw, Sexual Advances, and the "ReasonableMan" Standard, 85 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 726, 733 (1995) (noting with approval states' shift away from "rigid" categories);
Richard Singer, The Resurgence ofMens Rea: I-Provocation,Emotional Disturbance, and the Model
Penal Code, 27 B.C. L. REV. 243, 249 (1986) (asserting that the jury should decide provocation's
adequacy); see also MPC & COMMENTARIES § 210.3(1)(b) (1980) ("By eliminating any reference to
provocation in the ordinary sense of improper conduct by the deceased, the Model Code avoids
arbitrary exclusion of some circumstances that may justify reducing murder to manslaughter.").
43. It appears that only two states, Alabama and Illinois, retain the categorical approach. See,
e.g., Riggs v. State, 138 So. 3d 1014, 1024 (Ala. 2013) (adopting categories of witnessed adultery,
imminent assault, and witnessed assault on a close relative); People v. Hernandez, 562 N.E.2d 219,
226 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (enumerating the categories of substantial physical injury, mutual combat,
illegal arrest, and adultery); see also Berman & Farrell, supra note 32, at 1038 (observing that "the
categorical approach was replaced by a standard of reasonableness").
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person.44 Still, some states place certain categorical limits on provocation.
They require, for example, that the provoking act consist of physical conduct,
as opposed to "words alone." 45 A handful of states adopt the MPC's expansive
defense of EED.46 This broad version of provocation mitigates murder to
manslaughter when a defendant commits the killing "under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable
explanation or excuse." 47 Accordingly, anything may qualify as provocation so
long as it compels the requisite emotional state in the defendant and a fair
reason for that emotional state exists.
Debates rage in criminal law scholarship over the morally required,
socially desirable, and utile formulation of the provocation defense.48 Instead
of delving into each of these conversations, which could (and have) filled up
entire volumes of law reviews 4 9 and are not fully germane to the Article's main
thesis, it should suffice to describe briefly the principal areas of contention.
One such issue involves categorizing the provocation defense as an excusemeaning the defendant committed a wrongful but legally excusable act; or as a
justification meaning that the defendant committed a nonwrongful act.5 0 This
issue is further subdivided into whether the defense should be called a
justification or an excuse because calling it one or the other either is more
descriptively accurate or is analytically compelled.' Other, more normative,
debates include how provocation claims should be categorized given the legal
implications of calling the defense a justification or excuse, and whether it is

44. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-2
§ 14:31(A)(1) (2011) ("average person"); Mo.

(2014) ("reasonable person"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
ANN. STAT. § 565.002(1) (West 2012) ("person of

ordinary temperament"); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.050 (LexisNexis 2009) ("reasonable person");
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.44(1)(a) (West 2010) ("ordinarily constituted persof'); see also LEE, supra
note 9, at 235 (characterizing the purpose of reasonableness as creating "uniformity and fairness").
45. State v. Shane, 590 N.E.2d 272, 277-78 (Ohio 1992) ("[W]ords alone will not constitute
reasonably sufficient provocation to incite the use of deadly force in most situations."); see also
Cassels v. People, 92 P.3d 951, 960 (Colo. 2004); Girouard v. State, 583 A.2d 718, 721 (Md. 1991)
("Words spoken by the victim, no matter how abusive or taunting, fall into a category society should
not accept as adequate provocation.")
46. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1980).
47. Id.
48. See infra notes 48-55 and accompanying text. While utilitarian concerns occasionally
appear in the literature, see, e.g., Berman & Farrell, supra note 32, at 1076 (asserting that requiring
passion deters retaliatory killings); Adam Candeub, An Economic Theory of CriminalExcuse, 50 B.C.
L. REV. 87 (2009) (conceptualizing provocation in economic terms), most of the debate is distinctly
retributive; see also Dressler, supra note 13, at 963 ("[M]ost modern scholars would agree that the
basis for the defense of provocation is found in retributive concepts of desert.").
49. See generally, e.g., Symposium, supra note 32.
50. See Gabriel J. Chin, Unjustified: The PracticalIrrelevance of the Justification/Excuse
Distinction, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 79, 79 (2009) (observing that scholars "vigorously debate" the
subject).
51. See generally, e.g., Dressler, Rethinking Passion, supra note 32 (studying history and
practice of provocation law and concluding that it is excuse); Reid Griffith Fontaine, Adequate
(Non)Provocation and Heat of Passion as Excuse Not Justification, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 27
(2009) (asserting that logically, provocation is excuse); sources cited supranote 32.
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appropriate to call certain categories of killings justifiable rather than excusable
(and vice versa).52
A related scholarly debate concerns whether the provocation defense
should operate to exculpate the defendant completely, of murder only, or not at
all. Some argue that if a provoked killing is a justified killing (because the
victim in fact acted in a wrongful manner), it should fully exonerate the
defendant.5 3 Others assert that provocation as an excuse (where the defendant
was "reasonably" impassioned by "innocent' victim behavior) should not even
serve to mitigate murder to manslaughter. 5 4 Finally, some theorists argue that
the justification-versus-excuse issue is irrelevant either because such
categorization of provocation makes no actual difference" or because the
doctrine's problems do not stem from how it is categorized.5 6
Another series of debates, grounded in legal psychology, questions
passion as an exculpatory factor. Scholars problematize provocation's
distinction between emotion and intention, 7 and some contend that seemingly
passion-crazed defendants act quite deliberately." Alternatively, experts opine
that homicidal reactions often stem from emotional states quite different from
anger that the law ought to account for.59 Finally, there are multiple

52. See, e.g., Ashworth, supra note 32, at 307 (provocation is a partial justification); Stephen J.
Morse, The Irreducibly Normative Nature ofProvocation/Passion,43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 193,205
(2009) (asserting that categorizing provocation as excuse is normatively required).
53. See A.P. SIMESTER & G.R. SULLIVAN, CRIMINAL LAW: THEORY AND
DOCTRINE §10.5(b)(iii), at 348 (2d ed. 2003) (asserting that reasonably provoked defendants should be
acquitted); Dressler, supra note 13, at 980, 998 (prescribing exculpation for reasonable defendants).
54. See Gruber, Victim Wrongs, supra note 32 (proposing to eliminate provocation and replace
it with a defense based on wrongful victim conduct); Nelson, supra note 32 (favorably describing
Canadian provocation law's requirement of wrongful victim conduct); infra note 130 (noting abolition
proposals).
55. See, e.g., Chin, supra note 50, at 83 (denying that the justification/excuse "distinction is
important"); cf Kyron Huigens, A CriticalIntroduction to the Symposium, 43 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 1,
5 (2009) (observing that the taxonomic debate could "clarify the law's moral message for the public").
But see Dressler, Rethinking Passion, supra note 32 (emphasizing the importance of distinguishing
justification and excuse).
56. See, e.g., Samuel H. Pillsbury, MisunderstandingProvocation, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
143 (2009).
57. See, e.g., Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Crime, Punishment, and the Psychology of SelfControl, 61 EMORY L.J. 501, 550 (2012) (observing that psychology literature suggests that the
distinction between criminals who could not and did not exercise control "is immaterial"); Robert
Weisberg, The Values oflnterdisciplinarityin Homicide Law Reform, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 53,
65 (2009) (contending that the differences in psychological states underlying aggressive reaction do
not map neatly on to legal intentionality divides).
58. See, e.g., Coker, supra note 30, at 93; Susan D. Rozelle, Controlling Passion:Adultery
and the Provocation Defense, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 197, 220-27 (2006) (asserting that people have control
despite provocation and citing psychological studies).
59. See, e.g., People v. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. 868, 884 (Ct. App. 1991) (noting that "'passion'
need not mean 'rage' or 'anger' but may be any '[v]iolent, intense, high-wrought or enthusiastic
emotion') (quoting People v. Borchers, 325 P.2d 97 (Cal. 1958) (alteration in original)); Elise J.
Percy et al., "Sticky Metaphors" and the Persistence of the Traditional Voluntary Manslaughter
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conversations about the reasonableness requirement, including whether
reasonableness should be required, how subjective the requirement should be,
and how the standard impacts certain classes of defendants and victims.60

The above debates involve many important values such as morality, legal
coherency, and social utility. However, they are not principally concerned with
provocation law's relationship to gender-based hierarchy. Prior to the advent of
the feminist critique, criminal law scholars typically viewed expansive,
defense-friendly formulations, like EED, as liberal versions of provocation
law.61 Now, however, many left-leaning criminal theorists have abandoned
civil libertarian concern for homicide defendants' interests in favor of antisubordination concerns for female victims. Others find the entire matter
62
steeped in an insoluble dilemma.
II.
PROVOCATION FROM A GENDERED PERSPECTIVE

Most jurisdictions define adequate provocation in terms of the emotions
of a "reasonable person," as noted above. Thus, the fundamental question for
judges, jurors, and criminal law students throughout the United States is, "Who
is the reasonably provoked person?" Several years ago, I came upon an
excellent cultural depiction of the modem reasonable man provoked to kill by
way of the 2002 movie Unfaithful.63 Attractive, refined, gray-haired
businessman Richard Gere is married with a child to the lovely Diane Lane and
living an idyllic suburban life, free from marital or financial strife. Gere, a
phlegmatic but uptight type, kills the man with whom Lane serendipitously fell
into a passionate, adulterous affair. Although Gere does not catch Lane in the
very act of adultery, 64 he nonetheless has positive proof that infidelity
occurred.65 At the paramour's apartment, he notices a snow globe he had given
Lane previously as a special gift, which triggers his passion. Gere becomes
physically ill and in a moment of blind fury hits the paramour over the head
with the snow globe just twice, but with enough force to hasten death. Notably,
Gere does not commit any act of violence against the diminutive Lane, who is

Doctrine, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFoRM 383, 394 (2011) (stating that "anger is not the only [passionate]
emotion").
60. See supranotes 9-11 and accompanying text; infra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
61. See Nourse, supra note 27, at 1384-85.
62. See supranote 21 (listing articles).
63. See generally Stephen Holden, Film Review; Day in Town Takes an Unexpected Tryst,
N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/08/movies/film-review-day-in-town
-takes-an-unexpected-tryst.html (reviewing film).
64. Cf Mays v. State, 14 S.E. 560, 562 (Ga. 1891) (requiring provocation defendant to find
"the deceased in the very act of adultery with his wife").
65. Cf id. (clarifying that it is sufficient if the defendant "found them together in such position
as to indicate with reasonable certainty to a rational mind that they had just then committed the
adulterous act").
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herself highly morally conflicted over the affair.66 Rather, he kills the
paramour, an over-sexed, strikingly seductive, French Lothario.67 To be sure,
Gere generally does not have a violent nature, which is visually confirmed by
the fact that he sports spectacles and a sweater vest during the killing.
Richard Gere is what one might imagine-and Hollywood has
imagined-as the reasonable cuckold provoked to kill. This literal reasonableman script involves a white, upper-middle class, caring husband driven by
passion to uncharacteristically and almost involuntarily commit violence
against an unsympathetic male victim.68 In popular culture, two characters
comprise the adequately provoked killer. One is the man, who after being
wronged in some horrific manner (usually the wanton slaying of a loved one),
plots understandable, if not justified, revenge. 69 The other is the person who
suddenly "snaps" in the face of an emotionally charged event.70 Previously,
men exclusively occupied the media space of the reasonably provoked killer,
71
but today, women characters are increasingly taking on that role. In fact, an
argument could be made that the concept of a killer who "snapped" conjures up
72
the image of a murderess. In the case of adultery killings, like the one in
Unfaithful, the provoked killer has both characteristics he is somewhat
justified in the killing, and he snapped.
Decades ago, feminist scholars began to demonstrate that the popular
script of adequately provoked intimate killers may be true in Hollywood
movies but not in the real world. Some critics take the hardline position that
any adultery killing, even one as sanitized as Gere's, reflects masculinist norms
of violence and gender subordination and should not be mitigated.73 Others
seek to expose the "real faces" of male intimate homicide defendants.74 Far
from being nonviolent cuckolded husbands who snapped, male intimate killers
who invoke the provocation defense include batterers, jealous men speculating
about adultery, controlling spouses angered by their wives' attempts to leave,

66. See Holden, supra note 63 (calling Lane's character sympathetic).
67. See id. (observing that the film reduces the paramour to "a generic Continental rake").
68. See Coker, supra note 30, at 89-90 (observing "the popular image" of a wife killer as
someone who "suddenly cracked").
69. See BRAVEHEART (Paramount Pictures 1995) (Mel Gibson's character); COLLATERAL
DAMAGE (Warner Bros. 2002) (Arnold Schwarzenegger's character); PRINCESS BRIDE (Act III
Communications 1987) (Inigo Montoya); DEATH WISH (Dino De Laurentiis Co. & Paramount
Pictures 1974) (Charles Bronson's character).
70. See FALLING DOWN (Canal+, Alcor Fils, Regency Enterprises & Warner Bros. 1993)
(Michael Douglas's character); SHUTTER ISLAND (Paramount Pictures & Phoenix Pictures 2010)
(Leonardo DiCaprio's character).
71. See, e.g., THE BRAVE ONE (Warner Bros. 2007) (Jodi Foster's character).
72. There is a true crime series on the Oxygen network devoted to women killers, entitled
Snapped (Oxygen television broadcast Aug. 6, 2004-present).
73. See, e.g., Rozelle, supra note 58; Milgate, supra note 21, at 224 (calling for "the
abolishment of the heat of passion defense in spousal infidelity cases").
74. See, e.g., Coker, supranote 30.
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or a combination of all three. Today, critics harp on the contention that the
provocation defense, especially EED, "shelters" abusive and murderous men
76
with banal frequency.
The first rumblings of this now-familiar critique appeared in the mid1980s. In 1986, Laurie Taylor, a UCLA law student, authored a comment
exposing and critiquing gender disparities in the criminal law's treatment of
intimate homicides.
The comment begins with the bold empirical
observations, "[h]omicide is overwhelmingly a male act," and "[w]omen rarely
kill," 78 leading the reader to believe it will ultimately reject lenient defenses
that disproportionately benefit male killers. Surprisingly, however, Taylor
primarily argues that the provocation doctrine is too narrow and does not
appropriately accommodate women who kill. 79 Thus, ironically, one of the first
pieces about provocation law from a gendered perspective criticizes the
overpunishment of women rather than the underpunishmentof men.
In constructing her argument, Taylor relies heavily on Catharine
MacKinnon's observations about the inevitability of jurists infusing objective
reasonableness with male attributes.so The problem, Taylor maintains, is that
"reasonable provocation" might not accommodate the emotions that drive
women to kill-fear, depression, and sadness rather than anger.' Additionally,
the ways in which women develop these emotions may differ from the
"snapped" scenario. 82 Taylor thus asserts that provocation law should accept a
variety of emotions as constituting "passion," and permit women to argue that
provocation can develop over time.8 Accordingly, her argument parallels the
75. See infra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
76. See GR. BR. LAW COMM'N, REPORT ON PARTIAL DEFENCES TO MURDER 299 (2004); see
also, e.g., Antonia Elise Miller, Note, Inherent (Gender) Unreasonableness of the Concept of
Reasonableness in the Context ofManslaughterCommitted in the Heat ofPassion, 17 WM. & MARY
J. WOMEN & L. 249, 250 (2010) (asserting that provocation protects "[m]ale defendants who kill");
Miller, supra note 21, at 666 (calling the MPC's "expansion" of provocation doctrine "particularly
disastrous for women").
77. Laurie J. Taylor, Comment, Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat-of-Passion
Manslaughterand Imperfect Self-Defense, 33 UCLAL. REV. 1679 (1986).
78. Id. at 1679-80. Taylor's actual statistics, however, do not demonstrate such a wide gap
between male and female intimate killers. According to the comment, 755 men killed their wives or
girlfriends compared to 477 women who killed their boyfriends or husbands in 1986. Id. at 1680 n.9,
1681 n.10.
79. See id. at 1682-83 (asserting that provocation law's standard is not accommodating toward
women defendants and opining that the law must "incorporate an informed understanding of the full
spectrum of human behavior to ensure criminal justice for women as well as for men").
80. See id. at 1690 (quoting MacKinnon's statement, "When [the state] is most ruthlessly
neutral, it will be most male; when it is most sex blind, it will be most blind to the sex of the standard
being applied.") (quoting Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward
Feminist Jurisprudence,8 SIGNS 173, 196 (1983)).
81. See id. at 1714-15 ("Women who kill in a passion of fear for their physical safety would
then have the same protection as men who kill in a passion of rage to 'defend' their honor.").
82. Id. at 1717.
83. Id. at 1719 ("Cumulative terror should serve as an emotion adequate for heat-of-passion
manslaughter.").
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feminist critiques of self-defense, which claim that the "imminent harm"
requirement disfavors battered women who kill abusers.8 4 The only concrete
suggestion the comment makes for narrowing the defense consists of a
proposal to prevent men from asserting they killed in response to women's
provocative "course of conduct." 8 5 In the end, the comment opines that the
MPC's broad EED defense holds the most promise for gender equality, stating
that "a sensitive and informed adoption of the Model Penal Code might help
equalize the balance" because "the Code's more subjective standard may better
accommodate female defendants." 86
In 1991 and 1992, a book and law review article steered the gender
discussion away from provocation's inadequate protection of sympathetic
female defendants and toward its inadequate punishment of unsympathetic
male defendants. In the 1991 book, Provocation and Responsibility, legal
historian Jeremy Horder discusses the historical and philosophical
underpinnings of the provocation defense in general and offers a persuasive
gender-based case for abolishing it.8 7 The book critically retells the story of
seventeenth century English provocation law, which historians had previously
described as grounded in mercy and the frailty of man. Horder alternatively
describes the doctrine as largely a product of bygone views regarding male
honor.89 Normatively, the book sets forth a searing indictment of the British
provocation defense as disadvantageous to women. 90 Horder contends that
discrimination occurs because deserving women (abuse survivors) are unable
to utilize the defense while undeserving men (sexist men with histories of
violence) use it frequently. 9' Thus, Horder's analysis departs from Taylor's in
the sense that broadening provocation to accommodate battered women will
not solve the primary problem of exonerating culpable men. Horder further
makes an expressivist argument92 that provocation law communicates that
"there is something natural, inevitable, and hence in some (legal) sense-to-berecognized forgivable about men's violence against women, and their violence

84. See, e.g., Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence: A
Redefinition ofBattered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1194-95 (1993) ("[B]attered
women may reasonably perceive themselves to be in imminent danger in situations when this may not
otherwise be apparent to the outside observer."); Richard Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and
Women Who Kill Their Batterers,71 N.C. L. REV. 371, 376 n.10 (1993) (citing 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON,
CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 131(c)(1) (1984)).
85. See Taylor, supra note 77, at 1697-98, 1718-25.
86. Id. at 1733.
87.
HORDER, supra note 15, at 178.
88. See Ashworth, supra note 32; infra Part IVA.
89. HORDER, supra note 15, at 26-29; infra note 142.
90. See HORDER, supra note 15, at ch. 9.
91. Id. at 186-87.
92.
See infra Parts III.D & IV.D. (discussing expressivism).
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in general." 93 Ultimately, Horder argues that the only way to remedy
provocation's discriminatory and expressivist problems is to abolish it. 94
In a similar vein, Professor Donna Coker's 1992 article, Heat of Passion
and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill, is a complex and forceful
indictment of provocation law's complicity in constructing false images of men
who kill their female partners.95 The article lends itself to a narrow and a broad
reading. Under a narrow interpretation, the article primarily serves an educative
function by demonstrating that many defendants one might initially believe to
be reasonably provoked by adultery are, in fact, pattern abusers who acted in
character. 96 In this reading, the only problem with the provocation defense is
that the adultery category may reinforce the public's misconceptions about wife
97
killers and allow men predisposed to violence to claim they acted in passion.
Moreover, according to the article, judges and juries will be in a tolerable
position to apply the defense in cases that actually merit it after public
misconceptions have been corrected. 98
The article also makes some stronger claims. For example, Coker implies
that male-on-female intimate homicides, even ones involving witnessed
adultery, virtually never occur spontaneously. 99 They, like battering in general,
are products of conscious and deliberate patterns of control and abuse.' 00
Moreover, Coker appears to criticize provocation writ largely for its normative
approval of a masculinist culture of anger and violence.' 0 ' Given these broad
objections, one might expect Coker to advocate wholesale abandonment of the
defense, or at least prohibition of the application of the defense to male-onfemale intimate homicides.1 02 In the end, she does not recommend any specific
law reform. Nevertheless, her observations about provocation's gender

93.

HORDER, supranote 15, at 194.

94.

Id. at 197.

95.
96.

Coker, supra note 30.
See id. at 83 (asserting that the doctrine "hides the degree to which 'adultery killings' are

really like other wife-killings").
97.
See id. at 76 (contending that adultery's status as the paradigmatic provocation
perpetuates the "misconceptions" that wife killers act from sudden provocation rather than "personal
inclination to be violent with female intimate partners").
98. Id. at 129 (dispelling the "myth" that "men who kill their wives or girlfriends do so in the
heat of 'uncontrolled passion').
99.
See id. at 84 (recognizing that reasonably provoked killers may exist but that this
description does not apply to "men who kill their female partners"); id. at 94 (asserting that if the
impassioned wife killer "does exist, he is apparently part of a very small group").

100.
original)).

Id. at 129 (contending that wife-killings are generally "planned killings" (emphasis in

101.
Id. at 102 (problematizing the assumptions that men become enraged and 'that rage
leads inevitably to violence"); infra Part III.D.2 (arguments about provocation's pro-violence
message).
102.
Coker does strongly intimate that the law needs to be reformed. See Coker, supra note
30, at 130 ("We must . . plac[e] the legal and cultural analysis of wife-murder squarely within that of
wife-battering." (emphasis in original)).
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problems linger like a bad taste and move the reader inexorably toward an
abolitionist stance.
Professor Victoria Nourse's 1997 Yale Law Journal article, Passion's
Progress:Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense played the most
prominent role in elevating the gender inequality argument to the primary
critique of provocation.1 03 The article is cited in hundreds of publications and
appears in many of the leading criminal law casebooks.1 04 It begins with the
observation that broad provocation standards, particularly EED, permit male
killers to argue that they were provoked by their wives' and girlfriends'
departures.'0 o From this observation, the article lodges two principle objections
to the defense. First, the article makes a gendered argument that the law
encourages abused or unhappy women to stay with their male partners
(presumably because the doctrine makes men more likely to exact a private
death penalty as the price of separation).106 Second, the article sets forth a more
general argument that the law is idiosyncratic, and thus, doctrinally unsound
because it protects those who react violently to "lawful" victim conduct. 0 7
Because I am primarily concerned with the gender critique of provocation, this
Article will concentrate on the first claim, which also constitutes Nourse's main
legacy.
Passion's Progressrecognizes up front that the EED defense is neutral on
its face.'0 8 The problem, it contends, is that the neutral language of EED hides
normative judgments about the circumstances under which people are entitled
to become emotionally disturbed.' 09 This argument resembles Taylor's
assertion, channeling MacKinnon, that apparently neutral legal rules will
inevitably benefit men in male supremacist societies. 'o Unlike Taylor,
however, Nourse's primary issue is not that male intimate killers are more
successful in arguing provocation than female intimate killers. Rather, she
objects to the ability of sexist male intimate killers to assert that they were

103. Nourse, supra note 27.
104. See, e.g., criminal law casebooks cited, supra note 17. A Westlaw keycite citing reference
search on the article reveals 149 citing references.
105. Nourse, supra note 27, at 1332 (noting the significant number of cases involving "the
desire of the killer's victim to leave a miserable relationship.").
106. Id. at 1334 (observing that under EED "a battered wife who leaves has, by that very
departure, supplied a reason to treat the killing with some compassion").
107. Id. at 1334 (observing that "[r]arely, if ever, does the criminal law embrace defendants
who kill in response to a lawful act or trivial slights") (internal citations omitted), 1396-97 ("The law
only suffers contradiction when it refuses to embrace a sense of outrage which is necessary to the
law's rationalization of its own use ofviolence.") (emphasis in original).
108. Id. at 1333-34.
109. Id. at 1333 (stating that the MPC's seemingly neutral concern with self-control "masks a
different, more pernicious" set of "judgments about the equities of relationships"), 1398 ("[D]ecisions
applying this defense express judgments about when defendants 'should' exercise self-control.").
110. Id. at 1387 ("If the defendants involved in these cases are largely male, it follows that the
description of the defendant (who the 'man' is) becomes the arbiter of the implicit normative question
(how we should 'relate' to each other).").
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reasonably provoked at all."' The principal pathology the article identifies is
that courts allow specious claims of provocation (namely, those based on
separation) far more frequently under broad constructions of the defense
(specifically EED) than under narrow ones.112 The article offers original
empirical evidence in support." 3 Thus, its unique concern is the
underenforcement of murder laws against wife killers. Having described the
problem as one of courts approving too many sexist provocation claims,
Nourse proposes law reform to minimize it.11 4 She endorses a redesigned
provocation doctrine that would apply only in cases where the defendant had
"warranted" grounds for outrage." 5 The killer's emotional reaction must mirror
a communal sense of morality, as enumerated by criminal laws.11 6 In other
words, provocation law may not "distinguish the defendant's sense of
emotional wrongfulness from the law's own sense of appropriate
retribution ...
the defendant's emotional judgments [must be] the law's
,,117
own.
If one interprets the proposal in Passion's Progress to require that
defendants' judgments strictly mirror codified criminal law, it would be a
narrow defense indeed. The criminal law prescribes death for only one type of
crime: aggravated murder. Thus, it would seem that only those defendants
provoked by witnessing aggravated murder of loved ones could prevail under
the reformulated defense. Nourse, however, points to the (curiously
gendered)" 8 example of the man who kills his wife's rapist as a
paradigmatically warranted killing.' 19 Consequently, the article envisions that a
defendant's judgments could match the formal criminal law's in a much looser
sense. The limitation really boils down to the requirement that the provoking
victim behavior constitute some underlying crime-though not necessarily a

111. See id. at 1370 (asserting that because the provocation defense, even EED, has an
evaluative component, allowing sexist defendants to assert provocation is a functional normative
approval of their judgments).
112. See id. at 1343 (contending that in EED jurisdictions separation "is as likely, if not more
likely" a ground for the defense than an affair or other sexual infidelity).

113. Id. at 1342-68.
114. Id. at 1338 (noting that her proposal would "bar[] manslaughter verdicts in most intimate
homicide cases").

115. See id. at 1392-1406 (Part IV.B).
116. Id. at 1392 (asserting that provocation is appropriate when the defendant "is expressing
outrage in ways that communicate an emotional judgment . . that is uncontroversially shared, indeed,
that the law itself recognizes").

117. Id.
118. Killing men who sexually violate women seems to
paradigmatically provoked killing. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Martha
of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 313 (1996)
who kills a man in anger after discovering that he has sexually abused

119. Nourse, supra note 27, at 1337-38, 1392.

be a favored example of a
C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions
(calling reasonable the "woman
the woman's young daughter").
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crime punishable by death or even long-term imprisonment.120 This
requirement might exclude defendants provoked by adultery, which is only
"nominally" unlawful, and separation alone, which is lawful. 12 However, her
proposal still allows similar defendants whose wives fought back in some way
to invoke the defense. Moreover, the proposal also makes the defense
unavailable to other sympathetic classes of defendants, for example, serially
bullied kids, postpartum infant killers, and minorities provoked by racial
epithets. Yet, Nourse holds that racial epithets can count as provocation
"because they can be analogized to hate-crime offenses."122 However, if
analogic reasoning is fair game, Nourse's seemingly bright-line warranted
excuse/legality rule looks more akin to the MPC's standard of a "reasonable
explanation or excuse."1 23 Consequently, depending on its application,
Nourse's apparently neutral criterion may also hide normative judgments that
reinforce social hierarchies, including gendered ones.124
Passion's Progress sparked an explosion of gender-based critiques of
provocation that continue to proliferate today.1 25 The vast majority of the
articles have several features in common. First, they nearly universally discuss
the chauvinistic origins of the defense in old Britain.126 Many quote the early
eighteenth-century provocation case, Regina v. Mawgridge, which called
adultery the "highest invasion of property," to support the proposition that the
defense is inextricably linked to women's historical subordination, including
chastisement. 127 Second, the vast majority of articles describe in excruciating
detail the facts of individual brutal intimate killings. 12 For example,
120. Nourse notes that the lawfulness test is "not a doctrinal standard" and allows that outrage
"based on conduct that appears lawful . . may reflect warranted emotion under a different normative
reconstruction of the provoking behavior." Id. at 1396 n.38 1.
121. It seems, however, that Nourse believes this (more minor) unlawful victim behavior would
not count, as she envisions her proposal to bar intimate homicide claims. See id. at 1397 n.385
("Outrage inspired by nominally unlawful acts, such as adultery, should not reach a jury.").
122. V. F. Nourse, Upending Status: A Comment on Switching, Inequality, and the Idea of the
ReasonablePerson, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 361, 364-65 n.11 (2004).
123. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1980).
124. As Nourse recognizes, "the 'veil of relationship' is extraordinarily resistant to change and
will reassert itself " Nourse, supra note 27, at 1403.
125. See supra notes 17 & 21. According to Westlaw, the article has 148 citing references. All
the scholarly articles cited in supra note 21 that postdate Passion's Progresscite to its analysis.
126. See infra Part III.A.
127. R. v. Mawgridge, (1706), 84 Eng. Rep. 1107, 1115 (K.B.). For a discussion of
chastisement, see Carolyn B. Ramsey, Domestic Violence and State Intervention in the American West
and Australia, 1860-1930, 86 IND. L.J. 185, 233 n.271 (2011) (discussing the relationship between
voluntary manslaughter and chastisement in late nineteenth century Australia and United States); Reva
B. Siegel, "The Rule ofLove": Wife Beating as Prerogativeand Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 212229 (1996) (recounting history of chastisement doctrine). See generally infra Part IIIA.
128. See, e.g., LEE, supra note 9, at 38; see also id. at 36-37 (describing the Hippolito Martinez
case, in which married Martinez saw his female paramour dancing with a man (her brother)); Caroline
Forell, Homicide and the UnreasonableMan, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 597, 598 (2004) [hereinafter
Homicide] (stating that the author was "haunted" by the admittedly extreme case of Javier Romero, an
abuser who stabbed his wife and son to death and received a sentence of ten years for murder); Miller,
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provocation critic Susan Rozelle recounts the 1980 Arkansas case of Randall
Dixon:
Randall Dixon and his fiancee went out with friends to celebrate their
engagement, but because his bride-to-be danced with another man at
the party, Dixon beat her to death. He first attacked her at the
celebration, then followed her to her sister's house, where he beat her
until she stopped breathing. He revived her with mouth-to-mouth
resuscitation, then took her home and continued the assault. When the
beating stopped at 5:00 a.m., his fiancee again lay unconscious. This
time she never woke up. She remained on a respirator until she died,
twelve days after the party. The Arkansas jury was instructed that it
could find Dixon guilty of only manslaughter, rather than murder, if it
believed he acted "under the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance for which there is reasonable excuse." The jury voted
manslaughter.129

Such heart-wrenching anecdotes prime readers to feel that male intimatehomicide defendants should receive the most exacting punishment available
under law and to regard the provocation doctrine as incontestably defective
because it fails to produce appropriate retribution. 130 Thus, it comes as little
surprise that the final common attribute in gender-based provocation critiques
is that such scholarship generally proposes ratchet-up reforms, meaning
reforms that make punishment harsher or more likely. 131

supra note 21, at 665 (beginning article with story of Calvin Ott, who killed his estranged wife); Tom
Stacy, Changing Paradigms in the Law of Homicide, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1007, 1035-36 (2001)
(introducing mitigation analysis with the story of defendant Schnopps, who killed his wife after she
said she was divorcing him and that she had "something bigger and better [to have sex with]" (quoting
Commonwealth v. Schnopps, 417 N.E.2d 1213, 1216 (Mass. 1981))). Nourse quotes extensively from
the fact sections of murder cases, see Nourse, supra note 27, at 1342-43, 1351-52, 1358-59, 1362-63,
including the case of "Smith" who, after finding out his girlfriend Becky was leaving him, "shot
through the door [of Becky's family's home], killing Becky's half-sister, then went into the house and
killed Becky's mother. Some time later, as the ambulance attendants administered to the victims,
Smith killed Becky and the daughter she was holding in her arms." Id. at 1343 (internal citation
omitted).
129. Rozelle, supra note 58, at 201. Another extreme case that captured the scholarly
imagination is the 1976 case, People v. Berry, in which the defendant, an abuser, strangled his wife to
death and was permitted to argue provocation based on his wife's "course of provocatory conduct."
See 556 P.2d 777, 781 (Cal. 1976). Scholarship discussing the case includes Coker, supranote 30. See
also KATHARINE T. BARTLETT & DEBORAH L. RHODE, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE,
COMMENTARY 344-63 (5th ed. 2010) (excerpting and analyzing Berry, 556 P.2d 777); LEE, supra
note 9, at 43-45; Forell, Homicide, supra note 128, at 605.
130. See JOSEPH A. AMATO, VICTIMS AND VALUES: A HISTORY AND A THEORY OF
SUFFERING 175 (1990) ("There is an elemental moral requirement to respond to innocent suffering.");
Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 412 (1996)
("We ought not to pretend that storytelling and empathy are value neutral, when in fact they are potent
weapons.").
131. See, e.g., Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 118, at 352 (endorsing an "evaluative"
formulation in which defendants' emotional reactions must stem from correct moral appraisals);
Gruber, Victim Wrongs, supra note 32, at 718 (endorsing a lack of predisposition requirement); Miller,
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Critics of the provocation defense have set forth various proposals for
reigning in provocation. Many critics, such as Jeremy Horder, assert that
eliminating the defense is the sole means of achieving gender justice.132 Some,
like Victoria Nourse, propose to limit the defense by narrowing the definition
of adequate provocation. 133 While Nourse creates a warranted excuse/legality
test, others call for "normative" reasonable standards or the requirement of "act
reasonableness," as urged by the prosecution in Beltran.134 One of the more
female-centric suggestions has been a "reasonable woman" standard, requiring
the defendant, male or female, to act like a reasonable woman.1 35 The next Part
catalogues and describes the various theoretical arguments underlying critics'
calls to narrow provocation.
III.
A TYPOLOGY

OF THE FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF PROVOCATION

This Part seeks to distill the principal analytic constructs underlying the
feminist critique of provocation. It is worthwhile to note that the arguments laid
out below represent the most forceful objections to the provocation doctrine in
general. They are less concerned with modest tweaks that incrementally narrow
provocation. It is true that some critics advocate less radical changes to
provocation law for example, eliminating just the adultery category 36 or
adopting a caveat that men with a documented history of abuse cannot argue
provocation.1 37 These limited reforms leave the provocation doctrine largely

supra note 76, at 274 (calling for the elimination of the provocation defense in cases involving abuse);
Clavel, supra note 21, at 350 (same).
132. See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text; see also Miller, supra note 2 1, at 692-93
(advocating abolition); Rozelle, supra note 58, at 232-33 (advocating abolition except for cases of
excessive force in self-defense).
133. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text (discussing "act reasonableness" in People v.
Beltran, 301 P.3d 1120, 1125 (Cal. 2013)); see, e.g., LEE, supra note 9, at 246 & 260-69 (proposing
that provocation should have a "normative" definition of reasonableness and include act
reasonableness); Gruber, Victim Wrongs, supra note 32, at 651 (asserting that the defense should only
apply to "wrongful" behavior); Pillsbury, supra note 56, at 144, 148 (restricting the defense to those
who respond to "serious wrongs").
135. CAROLINE A. FORELL & DONNA M. MATTHEWS, A LAW OF HER OWN: THE
REASONABLE WOMAN AS A MEASURE OF MAN 172 (2000).

136. Today, proposals to eliminate the adultery category while keeping intact the remainder of
the doctrine are largely unnecessary, given that so few jurisdictions retain an explicit adultery
category. See Nourse, supra note 27, at 1341 (observing that only two states retain a categorical
approach).
137. Domestic homicide statutes narrowly address the issue of pattern abusers claiming
provocation. For example, Minnesota's statute makes it first degree murder when a defendant "causes
the death of a human being while committing domestic abuse, when the perpetrator has engaged in a
past pattern of domestic abuse upon the victim or upon another family or household member." MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.185(a)(6) (West 2009). Interestingly, the statute applies the same logic to child
abuse, making it first degree murder when a defendant "causes the death of a minor while committing
child abuse, when the perpetrator has engaged in a past pattern of child abuse upon a child." Id. at
§ 609.185(a)(5). Such a provision may negatively affect many female defendants. See Heather Leigh
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intact and address the overarching gender problem only modestly.1 38 For
example, a provision preventing repeat abusers from claiming provocation will
not stop sexist wife killers who fall outside the "repeat abuser" category from
invoking the defense.1 39 Accordingly, many feminist critics instead propose
far-reaching changes like abolition or generalized limitations of the defense's
applicability (i.e., calling for a "warranted excuse").140 Below is a
comprehensive overview of arguments behind such proposals.
A.

ProvocationLaw Is Steeped in ChauvinistHistory

The majority of writings maligning provocation emphasize the doctrine's
apparently sexist origins. 14' According to critical commentators, old English
jurists created the voluntary manslaughter doctrine to protect men who
responded to affronts to their honor particularly the affront of marital
infidelity.1 42 The doctrine is thus inextricably entwined with the antiquated
principle that women are men's property, to be defended from "invasion" by
death (primarily through slaying the "invader"). 143 By giving license to men to
kill for thefts of affection, the provocation law substantively limited women's
ability to leave abusive, controlling, and unsatisfying relationships, or engage
in consensual extramarital sexual relations. 144 Scholars also link the defense to
the antiquated principle of chastisement, which prescribed low-level violence

Stangle, Murderous Madonna:Femininity, Violence, and the Myth ofPostpartum Mental Disorderin
Cases of Maternal Infanticide and Filicide, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 699, 706 (2008) (discussing
intimate homicides committed by women); Lorraine Schmall, Forgiving Guin Garcia: Women, the
Death Penalty and Commutation, 11 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 283,301 (1996) (same).
138. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 76, at 274 (proposing that the defense should not apply to
cases involving abuse); Taylor, supra note 77, at 1718-19 (proposing that provocation law disallow
defendants to argue their anger was provoked by a "course of conduct").
139. See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 27.
140. See id. at 1338.
14 1. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 2 1, at 669 (observing the "masculine assumptions of the
common law of voluntary manslaughter").
142. The notion that modem provocation law is grounded in seventeenth century notions of
honor can be traced to Jeremy Horder, who endeavored to demonstrate that traditional categorical
provocation law, developed in the seventeenth century, was less a product of medieval juries'
inclinations toward temperance and more a product of a "quixotic" "honour theor[y]" writings.
HORDER, supra note 15, at 25-29; see also Coker, supra note 30, at 79 (tracing the doctrine to the
"settlement of 'breaches of honor'); Forell, Gender Equality, supra note 25, at 31 ("[T]he
provocation defense began as a common law doctrine about men defending their honor."). But see
Taylor, supra note 77, at 1684 ("The law of manslaughter emerged in sixteenth-century England partly
in reaction to the rigidity and severity of the law of homicide."); infra Part IV.A.
143. See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Equality, Objectivity, andNeutrality, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1043,
1062 (2005) ("[P]rovocation law reflected . . prevalent norms about women as male property.");
Milgate, supra note 21, at 226 (maintaining that the defense "was developed at a time in which the
woman's identity was dictated by that of her husband"); Miller, supra note 76, at 256 (asserting that
the provocation doctrine encouraged men "to retaliate against any trespass on his most precious
property: his wife").
144. See Miller, supra note 21, at 672 (opining that provocation law reflected the antiquated
view that an unfaithful wife "lost the moral authority needed to fulfill her domestic roles").
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as an acceptable method of controlling wives.145 Consequently, the common
sentiment regarding provocation's past is that the "doctrine has its historical
roots in a value system that embraced the oppression of women."1 46
B. ProvocationLaw Underpunishes Culpable Male Murderers
Provocation critics contend that the doctrine (especially in its broad form)
prevents the state from appropriately enforcing criminal law against sexist
killers who deserve punishment for murder.1 47 According to the critique, the
doctrine does more than just allow some guilty to slip through the cracks-it
creates the conditions under which many culpable defendants avoid appropriate
punishment.1 48 Some critics simply assume that because the defense has the
potential to partially exonerate this class of killers, it actually does so in large
numbers.1 49 Others, most notably Victoria Nourse, endeavor to provide
empirical evidence that slippage occurs in non-negligible quantities. "s Nourse,
for example, examined all provocation cases from MPC jurisdictions from
1980 to 1995 and found that men who killed their partners in response to
threatened or attempted separation were extremely successful at getting their
provocation claims to the jury.
This underenforcement argument has an anti-majoritarian strain and a
majoritarian strain. In the anti-majoritarian strain, widespread gender bias
currently exists among judges, jurors, and in our culture. Society largely

145. See Ramsey, supra note 127, at 233 n.271 (discussing the relationship between voluntary
manslaughter and chastisement in late nineteenth century Australia and United States). See generally
Siegel, supra note 127, at 2122-29 (recounting history of chastisement doctrine).
146. James J. Sing, Note, Culture as Sameness: Toward a Synthetic View of Provocation and
Culture in the CriminalLaw, 108 YALE L.J. 1845, 1865 (1999).
147. See, e.g., Forell, Homicide, supra note 128, at 609 ("The MPC's EED test for provocation
provides an 'abuse excuse' for certain violent men who hold perverse views of what it means to be a
man.") (internal citations omitted); Mayo Moran, The Reasonable Person:A Conceptual Biography in
Comparative Perspective, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv.

1233,

1258 (2010) (asserting

that

discriminatory application of provocation "results in a standard that under-convicts" culpable men).
148. See, e.g., Milgate, supra note 21, at 196 (contending that when provocation is applied to
"romantic" cases, "the results are nearly always unjust").
149. See, e.g., Coker, supra note 30, at 78 (arguing that provocation's structure suggests "likely
[underenforcement] outcomes at trial"); Steven F. Shatz & Naomi R. Shatz, Chivalry Is Not Dead:
Murder, Gender, and the Death Penalty, 27 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 64, 90 (2012) (asserting
that because of provocation law, "[m]any domestic violence killings do not result in a murder
conviction").
150. See Nourse, supra note 27, at 1332 n.2 (including every intimate homicide involving a
provocation claim in MPC jurisdictions over a fifteen-year period and "samples" from non-MPC
jurisdictions). Nourse intends the data to be illustrative, stating that her argument "could as easily be
made with 10 cases as with 200." Id. at 1348 n.97; cf Coker, supra note 30, at 78 (stating that "while
significant anecdotal evidence suggests that a voluntary manslaughter defense is successful for many
wife-killers, there is scarce empirical data or relevant appellate information on which to rely to discern
the realities of trial court practice") (internal citation omitted).
151. In MPC jurisdictions pure separation claims constituted 26 percent of all provocation
claims, 79 percent of which reached juries. See Nourse, supra note 27, at 1349, 1356 (charts with
percentages).
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tolerates male-on-female intimate killing because of misconceptions,
stereotypical thinking, or plain animus.1 52 Broad provocation laws thus permit
state actors and jurors to exercise chauvinistic empathy toward male murder
defendants.1 53 Consequently, a narrowed provocation law controls legal
decision makers' natural inclinations to be biased. In the anti-majoritarian
view, law reform is necessary to check the influence of powerful social and
cultural norms in the courtroom. The majoritarian strain of the argument
proceeds in an inverse manner by claiming that provocation law itself
"perpetuates[] ideas about men, women, and their relationships that society
long ago abandoned."1 54 Accordingly, judges and juries really do not wish to
confer leniency on sexist killers. However, the provocation law basically
compels these legal actors to be lenient toward a class of offenders they would
otherwise condemn. 5 5 In this view, reform that narrows the defense frees
judges and jurors to exercise judgments that truly reflect contemporary social
and cultural norms.
C. ProvocationLaw Formally DiscriminatesAgainst Women
In addition to the argument that the provocation doctrine treats too many
culpable male defendants leniently as an absolute number, other feminist critics
focus on the disproportionateleniency that the provocation doctrine confers on
male defendants.156 Much anti-provocation theorizing adopts a civil rights
framework that law and policy should not discriminate based on gender, race,
or other characteristics. 1 Accordingly, many feminist scholars disseminate the
message that the heat-of-passion doctrine, as implemented, disparately benefits
men and burdens women. 5 This seemingly straightforward claim of disparity
is actually a collection of comparisons. I discuss the two main comparisons
below.

152. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 76, at 250 (tracing provocation's problems to the "effects of
[society's] gender bias on the concept of reasonableness").
153. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 2 1, at 669 (asserting that broad provocation formulas allow
jurors "to give voice to their own prejudices").
154. Nourse, supra note 27, at 1332.
155. See Forell, Homicide, supranote 128, at 608-09 ("Under the MPC, juries are instructed in
a way that may appear to ask them to set [evolved] norms aside and excuse men who kill because of
their idiosyncratic antiwoman and antigay views."); Nourse, supra note 122, at 369 (contending that
under the MPC, "judges felt compelled to send almost any kind of a case to a jury").
156. See Sing, supranote 146, at 1865 (noting the feminist argument that provocation "registers
an adversely disproportionate impact on women").
157. See D. Barret Broussard, Comment, Principlesfor Passion Killing: An Evolutionary
Solution to Manslaughter Mitigation, 62 EMORY L.J. 179, 183 (2012) ("Feminists have criticized
manslaughter doctrine for its disparate impact on women.").
158. See Miller, supra note 21, at 669; see also Nourse, supra note 27, at 1332.
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The Provocation Defense Favors Male Intimate Killers over Female
Intimate Killers

One of the earliest and most popular discrimination-based critiques of the
heat-of-passion defense argues that the defense, by its nature or as applied,
disproportionately favors male defendants. 5 9 In other words, the defense
mitigates the charges of male intimate-partner killers at a greater rate than those
of female intimate-partner killers. 160 At times, the literature compares male
defendants' chances of successfully pleading provocation to female defendants'
chances of successfully pleading self-defense. 161 In this view, an injustice
occurs when the percentage of male killers who successfully mitigate their
charges to manslaughter exceeds the percentage of female killers who obtain
total acquittal. The solution to the problem of disproportionate leniency can be
a ratchet-up solution (making it harder for men to claim provocation), 162

ratchet-down solution (making it easier for women to claim provocation/selfdefense),163 or a combination of both.164 While some scholarship prescribes a

ratchet-down solution, notably the Taylor comment,165 most scholarship either
calls for ratcheting up punishment for men or a combination of ratcheting up
punishment for men and ratcheting down punishment for women.1 66

159. See, e.g., Milgate, supra note 21, at 201 (observing that the doctrine's "gendered
perspective" "may 'favor' the male over the female defendant").
160. See Taylor, supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text; Miller, supra note 76, at 267
(decrying provocation "law's willingness to grant leniency to men who retaliate against their unfaithful
wives, but not to women who kill their adulterous husbands").
161. See, e.g., Stacy, supra note 128, at 1039 (asserting that there is "inequity" because men can
assert provocation by adultery, but battered women have "great difficulty . . convincing courts to
instruct juries on self-defense and/or manslaughter"); Margaret C. Hobday, Note, A Constitutional
Response to the Realities ofIntimate Violence: Minnesota's Domestic Homicide Statute, 78 MINN. L.
REV. 1285, 1301-03 (1994) (illustrating "inequity" by comparing female intimate homicide
defendants' inability to pursue self-defense with male intimate homicide defendants' ability to pursue
provocation).
162. Such solution would operatively abandon women defendants. See infra Part IV.C. 1.
163. Such solution would not address the perceived underpunishment of sexist men. See supra
Part III.B.
164. Cynthia Lee proposes a "switching" jury instruction whereby the jury hypothetically
switches the race/gender/sexual orientation of various parties to the murder case. See LEE, supra note
9, at 217-25 & 253-59. This would have the effect of sometimes ratcheting up (for example, when the
jury has to imagine what a "reasonable wife" would have done in a case where the man killed his wife
for leaving) and sometimes ratcheting down (for example, when the jury has to imagine what a
"reasonable husband" would have done when the wife killed the husband who committed adultery).
Id. at 217-20.
165. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., FORELL & MATTHEWS, supra note 135, at 172 (proposing that the woman's
point of view be applied in all cases).

2015]

2.

A PROVOCATIVE DEFENSE

297

The ProvocationDefense GenerallyBenefits Men and Burdens Women

Many of the writings critical of provocation also make the point that
homicide is largely a male phenomenon.167 Based on this idea, some simply
denounce provocation law for generally advantaging murder defendants, who
are disproportionately men. 16 Critics also compare the aggregate interests of
male homicide defendants and victims to the aggregate interests of female
homicide defendants and victims.1 69 Because women are more likely to be

victims of male violence than perpetrators of violence against men, broad
defenses to violent crimes, like provocation, are generally bad for women.170
Broadening the scope of comparison from male and female defendants to male
and female parties to a homicide, or males and females in general, changes the
calculus. When merely comparing male and female defendants' chances of
success, one could support treating female defendants more leniently without
changing provocation's applicability to male defendants. This is, however,
unsatisfying to many provocation critics on the ground that "[g]iving women
the chance to argue for manslaughter, based on infidelity, does not free them
from the violent enforcement of sexual fidelity."' 7 ' If it is true that men commit
more intimate homicides against women than the reverse, aggregating female
defendants' and victims' interests generally supports narrowing the provocation
defense (ratcheting up). Even though a few female defendants will suffer, more
male defendants will suffer (thus benefitting female victims). The result is thus
a net benefit to women.172

D. ProvocationLaw Expresses Destructive Messages
The last category of feminist argument does not rely on evidence of
exoneration rates or enforcement disparities. Its logic is a priori and

167. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 77, at 1679-80; Miller, supra note 76, at 254 ("[T]he vast
majority of homicide defendants are male.").
168. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 21, at 669 (critiquing provocation doctrine on the ground that
women are "socialized" to respond to events like adultery "in a non-violent manner").
169. See, e.g., Caroline Forell, The Meaning of Equality: Sexual Harassment, Stalking, and
Provocation in Canada, Australia, and the United States, 28 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 151, 153 (2005)
(calling efforts to broaden provocation to accommodate women defendants unjust because "women
rarely kill 'in the heat of passion' but represent the vast majority of victims of such killings"); Moran,
supra note 147, at 1258 (observing that in provocation cases, women "tend to be the victims, not the
accused"); Miller, supra note 21, at 667 (recognizing that men can also be victims, but critiquing EED
on the grounds that "a greater percentage of victims of intimate homicide are female" and "more
homicides are considered manslaughter under the MPC").
170. See Miller, supra note 21, at 680 (asserting that "voluntary manslaughter continues to
serve a primarily male interest").
171. Nourse, supra note 122, at 365.
172. See Christina Pei-Lin Chen, Note, Provocation's Privileged Desire: The Provocation
Doctrine, "Homosexual Panic," and the Non- Violent Unwanted Sexual Advance Defense, 10
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 195, 220 (2000) (asserting that because women "are more frequently
homicide victims than offenders," provocation laws "greatly burden women as a group while
simultaneously not benefiting them") (footnotes omitted).

298

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 103:273

excruciatingly simple: provocation is bad, regardless of its actual effects,
because it sends the wrong messages about gender, morality, and human
nature.1 73 This argument incorporates "expressivist" penal theory because it
prioritizes the symbolic and communicative attributes of criminal law.1 74 Penal
theory, or the question of why it is ethical for the state to subject an offender to
punishment (typically through loss of liberty or life), has concerned Western
philosophers for millennia. 7 1 In the United States today, criminal law scholars
continue to debate, refine, and reformulate various justifications for
punishment, and penal theoretical scholarship is a vibrant cottage industry.
Theorizing on the unique expressive function of the penal law can be
largely traced to legal philosopher Joel Feinberg.1 76 Observing that criminal
punishment "has a symbolic significance largely missing from other kinds of
penalties," 7 7 Feinberg asserts that philosophical accounts of punishment "that
leave[] out the condemnatory function" are disappoint[ing]" and "offensively
irrelevant."7 8 It is clear that many if not most feminist provocation critiques, at
some level, set forth expressivist accounts of provocation. 179 The expressivist
critique that the provocation defense sends a bad message requires no evidence
of excessive acquittals of sexist abusers, disproportionate benefit to men, or
increases in intimate homicides. Instead, it can be based on a single instance of

173. See Berman & Farrell, supra note 32, at 1089 (noting the argument that "the provocation
doctrine reinforces beliefs that members of some groups are less worthy than the mainstream"); see
also Rozelle, supra note 58, at 215 (contending that provocation law has sent the wrong message and
"influenc[ed] behavior in an anti-social direction").
174. See Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in JOEL FEINBERG, DOING
AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONS1BLITY 95, 118 (1970) ("[I]t is social
disapproval and its appropriate expression that should fit the crime."). It is not entirely clear whether
Feinberg's expressivism is simply making a descriptive claim about punishment's tendency to express
messages, asserting that the expressive function justifies punishment, or contending that expressing the
correct messages is a necessary component of just punishment. See Aya Gruber, Righting Victim
Wrongs: Responding to PhilosophicalCriticismsof the Nonspecific Victim LiabilityDefense, 52 BUFF.
L. REV. 433, 470-71 (2004) [hereinafter Righting Wrongs] (calling "unclear" "whether expressivism
is itself a ground for criminal punishment or if expression is merely an ancillary aspect of the
government's execution of penal laws based on other philosophical grounds"); Bernard E. Harcourt,
Joel Feinberg on Crime and Punishment: Exploring the Relationship Between The Moral Limits of
the Criminal Law and The Expressive Function of Punishment, 5 BuFF. CRIM. L. REV. 145, 165-66
(2001).
175. See R.A DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 1 (1986) ("It is agreed that a system of
criminal punishment stands in need of some strenuous and persuasive justification.").
176. See Carol S. Steiker, Foreword: Punishment and Procedure:Punishment Theory and the
Criminal-CivilProceduralDivide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 803 (1997) ("Joel Feinberg can be credited with
inaugurating the 'expressionist' turn in punishment theory.").
177. Feinberg, supra note 174, at 98.
178. Id. at 105. Kahan and Nussbaum make the same assertion in stronger normative terms,
stating, "The expressive theory . .
reveals how much is at stake politically and morally in the
correspondence between the message that a wrongdoer's act conveys and the law's punitive retort."
Kahan & Nussbaum, supranote 118, at 352.
179. See, e.g., Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 118, at 351-53 (arguing in favor of a narrow
"evaluative" provocation defense on expressivist grounds); sources cited supranote 21 and infra notes
183-87.
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undeserved leniency or speculation about how the defense might be used. The
argument simply says that because the provocation defense opens up a
discursive space at trial for abusive men to argue their wives provoked them,
the doctrine signals legal approbation of masculinist violence. Consequently,
the provocation defense expresses two particularly pernicious messages, one
about gender and one about violence, discussed in turn below.
1.

The ProvocationDefense Reinforces Gender Stereotypes

Feminist critics assert that provocation law reflects and reinforces a vision
of the world "in which men are perceived and perceive themselves as natural
aggressors, and in particular women's natural aggressors. ""o In this view,
broad formulations of the doctrine and even the doctrine itself send a message
that men, and only men, are entitled to be homicidally angry when their
partners express interest in another or attempt to leave them.' 8 In turn, the law
encourages women to remain in unsatisfactory and even abusive
relationships.182 At the very least, the doctrine expresses tolerance for or
ambivalence toward male-on-female intimate homicides.' 83 For many theorists,
solving provocation's expressivist problem necessarily involves abolishing or
narrowing the law to signal that men should not be aggressive and that women
victims "count."1

2.

84

The ProvocationDefense Endorses Violence

Critics of the provocation defense often contend that reforming
provocation will communicate more than a message about gender. Reform
would express a general sentiment that all people should refrain from using

180. PLLSBURY, supra note 32, at 147.
181. See Tracey L. Meares et al., Updating the Study ofPunishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1171,
1203 (2004) (contending that provocation may "reinforce[] norms that equate male virtue with
devotion to patriarchal conceptions of honor"); Broussard, supra note 157, at 186-87 (asserting that
provocation "perpetuates harmful gender stereotypes" because it "privileges a type of homicide
committed most frequently by men"); ef Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 118, at 360 (asserting that
broad provocation formulations send "a message that fosters and gives comfort to . . . reprehensible

feelings").
182. See Coker, supra note 30, at 103 (contending that the provocation doctrine hides "the
cultural leaps that take place when a man determines first, that his wife's behavior is worthy of his
rage and second, when he translates that rage into violence"); Nourse, supra note 27, at 1335 ("Reform
often seems to tie women to relationships that they do not want, in effect, enforcing a rule of
'emotional unity."'); Broussard, supra note 157, at 186 (noting the argument that the defense
"subordinates women by allowing this kind of crime to be recognized in the law as less heinous").
183. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 118, at 352 (noting the argument that "lenient
treatment of certain offenses-whether domestic violence or hate crimes-shows that the well-being
of certain persons just 'doesn't count' in the eyes of the law"); Stacy, supra note 128, at 1050
(asserting that provocation law "can be seen to imply that intra-familial violence is not as wrongful as
violence in other contexts").
184. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 118, at 352 ("Because criminal law expresses
condemnation, what a political community punishes, and how severely, tell a story about whose
interests are valued and how much.").
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lethal violence in non-life-threatening situations. In fact, after exhausting all
other arguments, provocation critics often retreat to the safe harbor of
pacifism.' Particularly when faced with the tendency of narrowing proposals
to sacrifice women and minority defendants who might seek to use the
provocation defense, certain critics contend that nobody should engage in
unnecessary acts of violence.186 This anti-violence claim has two principle
bases. The first is that violence is bad because it is masculinist. 187 Similar to the
disparity argument outlined in Part III.C, critics contend that a violencepermissive society prioritizes men's interests (in being violent) over women's
interests (in being free from violence).' Thus, doctrines like provocation have
the effect of constructing the legal world in the image of men.
The second basis for this anti-violence argument is not necessarily
grounded in gender theory. The straightforward and convincing assertion is that
the law should not condone private violence because, quite simply, violence is
bad. 8 9 Some of the feminist literature adopts the general critique that
provocation law is unenlightened because of its undue tolerance of private
aggression.1 Proponents of this view maintain that society has moved away
from the time in which individuals settled disputes through contests of physical
strength, and thus today "[t]he good person does not kill even if terribly
provoked."191 The foregoing argument is virtually impossible to assail. Even
the most ardent civil libertarians and defense-friendly progressives who
critique mass incarceration stop short of arguing for lenient murder laws.192
After all, no sensible person likes violence. Adopting an anti-violence baseline,

185. See PLLSBURY, supra note 32, at 146 ("Several commentators have recently argued that
provocation should be abolished because it weakens the law's commitment to nonviolence.").
186. See, e.g., LEE, supra note 9, at 277-78 (contending that ratcheting up "makes particular
sense when the defendant has taken another human being's life").
187. See Forell, Gender Equality, supra note 25, at 65 (asserting that the defense sends "an
unacceptable message-that men's anger and use of violence against women is legitimate") (quoting
VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM'N, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE FINAL REPORT 30 (2004); see also
Alice Ristroph, CriminalLaw in the Shadow of Violence, 62 ALA. L. REV. 571, 589 (2011) (noting the
argument that provocation is a "shield for male violence, especially violence toward women").
188. See PATRICIA PEARSON, WHEN SHE WAS BAD: VIOLENT WOMEN AND THE MYTH OF
INNOCENCE 7 (1997) ("Violence is still universally considered to be the province of the male. Violence
is masculine. Men are the cause of it, and women and children the ones who suffer.").
189. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 21, at 683 (contending that the MPC supports norms that
excuse violence).
190. See, e.g., Coker, supra note 30, at 103 (asserting that provocation law "supports a belief in
the inevitability of an angry response to provoking events and then conflates anger with violence").
191. Morse, supra note 52, at 198.
192. See James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim
Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 48 (2012) (criticizing liberal scholars for focusing nearly exclusively on
the war on drugs even though 'the state's response to violent crime less diversion and longer
sentences has been a major cause of mass incarceration") (emphasis in original); Ristroph, supra
note 187, at 613 (noting that the "call to focus [critically] on actual physical violence has largely
gone unheeded").
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provocation critics narrow the pool of defendants, even women defendants,
who deserve sympathy for their violent choices.
This Part has endeavored to summarize the claims set forth explicitly and
impliedly by the feminist critique of provocation. I deliberately omitted some
of the more simplistic utilitarian assertions, such as "narrowing provocation
law will reduce intimate homicides,"1 93 for a few reasons. First, such claims
depend for the most part on the success of the other arguments. If, in fact,
broad provocation laws do not lead to widespread underenforcement of murder
laws against sexist wife killers then there is little ground for the utilitarian
* * *
*
*
194*
Second, critics' empirical
speculation that impunity is increasing crime.
assertions that tougher criminal laws increase social utility generally lack
evidentiary foundation.1 95 Perhaps a social scientist could demonstrate that
EED jurisdictions have, on average, higher numbers of intimate homicides than
similarly situated non-EED jurisdictions. However, no such study appears to
exist currently, and it would certainly be a challenge to design a study that
could satisfactorily demonstrate such a link. Moreover, progressives, including
feminists, are generally wary of the simplistic assertion that inadequately
severe prosecution and punishment is the principal cause of crime.
Nevertheless, I, for one, would welcome further empirical research on the
larger effects of the provocation doctrine.
IV.
DEFENDING PROVOCATION

This Part does not intend to
rather hopes to unsettle some
arguments. Here, I am certainly
endemically neutral or especially

be a polemic against the feminist position but
of the assumptions inherent in the above
not claiming that the provocation defense is
resistant to gender bias. It, like any other law,

193. See Dressler, supra note 13, at 966 (noting the argument that abolishing provocation
"might send a useful general deterrence message that people should manage their anger and stress
before emotions boil over in violence").
194. Although Feinberg specifically disavows this claim, see infra note 325 and accompanying
text, some commentators appear to assume that criminal laws that condemn certain crimes actually
reduce those crimes. Without addressing the voluminous literature on deterrence, see, e.g., JAMES
GLLIGAN, VIOLENCE: OUR DEADLY EPIDEMIC AND ITS CAUSES 94-96 (1996) (critiquing deterrence
as "based on complete and utter ignorance of what violent people are actually like"); Paul H. Robinson
& John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453, 459-65 (1997) (advancing these
criticisms). Cf Steven K. Erickson, Mind Over Morality, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1555, 1570 (2007)
(positing that deterrence criticisms "never gain much popular traction" because the public supports the
criminal system). It suffices to say that in the provocation context, the claim of deterrence is not
particularly supported by empirical evidence. See infra Part IV.B.
195. See, e.g., Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, MediatingRules in CriminalLaw, 93 VA.
L. REV. 1197, 1249 (2007) (reasoning that because passion is hard to resist, "a deterrence-oriented
criminal law should treat provoked murders more severely than unprovoked ones" without evidence
that more severe treatment will deter) (emphasis in original). To be fair, provocation defenders
sometimes simply assume that passion crimes are undeterrable, an assumption severely critiqued by
feminist scholars. See Coker, supra note 30, at 103.
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can be applied in a biased manner and in a way that reflects dominant cultural
paradigms. Rather, the point is that the gender arguments discussed above have
combined in such protean and powerful ways that they now operatively prevent
any challenge to the notion that provocation is merely a sexist relic best left in
the past.196 In turn, progressives repeatedly expend scholarly energy on
demonstrating the truth of this account. However, in doing so, scholars may be
missing some other critical questions: Who else, other than sexist abusers, uses
the provocation defense? Who are the winners and losers under narrow and
broad versions of the defense? What political work is the feminist critique of
the defense doing? How does the notion that increasing criminal punishment
can equalize gender relationships fit in with the philosophy of the late
twentieth-century American penal state? To consider these important questions,
progressive scholars must liberate themselves from the dogma that the heat-ofpassion defense is inherently a woman-hating doctrine.1 97 In problematizing the
arguments in the feminist critique, this Article hopes to create the conditions
under which critical scholars can be more open to reexamining the merits of the
provocation doctrine.
A.

ProvocationLaw Has a Complex History

Today, the critical history of provocation serves less as a counter to the
law's assumed validity and more as irrefutable proof of the doctrine's
congenital gender defects. A compelling method critics use to discredit the
provocation doctrine is exposing its apparently chauvinist origins.1 98 One might
argue that the interests historically served by the provocation doctrine matter
far less than how the law operates in current society. Indeed, exposing a
retrograde history has the potential to asperse any law with ancient origins,
even an uncontroversial one. History is, by definition, retrograde. Some
feminist provocation critics use critical history to counter the assumed
legitimacy and neutrality of existing law.199 Thus, to the extent that there may
be some persuasive value in the assertion that we ought to keep the provocation
defense because it has a long and venerable history,200 the feminist critical
history serves as an important equipoise.2 0 1 While this point is well taken, the
current scholarly consensus seems not to be that the provocation defense is

196. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
198. See supra Part ILA; notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
199. See generally Robert W. Gordon, CriticalLegalHistories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984)
(mapping the arguments of critical legal theorists who retell history).
200. See supra text accompanying note 11 (California Supreme Court emphasizing the long
history of the doctrine).
201. See, e.g., HORDER, supra note 15, at 25-29 (retelling the history of provocation and
connecting seventeenth-century provocation doctrine to "honour theory").
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inherently neutral, but that it is inherently biased and illegitimate.202 Today, the
feminist alternative history of provocation is arguably the dominant account of
the defense, and it is doing a lot of work. The common wisdom is that
203
provocation is an inherently sexist doctrine.
The historical argument, which highlights the provocation doctrine's ties
to chastisement and ownership of women as property, has undeniable
persuasive value on an aesthetic level. However, provocation's history, as one
might expect, is far more complicated than a one-dimensional gender account
suggests.204 Moreover, a myopic focus on one particular aspect of a doctrine's

history can lead to an impoverished contemporary assessment of the
205
doctrine.
The official feminist story of provocation is that it was formulated
to encourage exercises of masculine honor (dueling and brawling) and to
reinforce women's domestic inferiority. 206 Undeniably, the provocation
doctrine gave protection to defendants who killed in ways that reflected the
cultural mores of the day and that these mores were deeply influenced by
gender roles and stereotypes during the seventeenth century. Nevertheless, the
claim that the provocation doctrine's primary purpose was to bolster gender
roles and justify chastisement misaligns with historians' official story of the
207
defense.
Gender inequality is but one player in provocation's intricate
historical libretto.
Historians, including Jeremy Horder, are in fair agreement that the
original purpose of the defense was to protect defendants from the authority of
the state.208 Experts characterize the emergence of provocation principles in
fifteenth-century England as a response to the harshness of the extant murder
liability and sentencing regime.209 At that time, nearly all killings were
punishable as murders, and murder convictions necessitated the death

202. See, e.g., Wendy Keller, Disparate Treatment of Spouse Murder Defendants, 6 S. CAL.
REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 255, 263 (1996) (contending that "the notion that [sexist adultery] killings
are acceptable and entitle the perpetrator to a reduction to manslaughter remains embedded in our
patriarchal legal doctrines").
203. See supranote 25 and accompanying text.
204. In providing this historical review, I neither rely on specifically nonfeminist historical
accounts of provocation nor engage in original historical research, as I am not a legal historian. I
simply consider the historical papers and cases upon which critical articles, themselves, rely.
205. For example, feminist criminal law scholars have long complained of rape law's history of
sexist leniency towards rapists. However, there is a parallel history of rape law's overenforcement
against African American men. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal

Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 600 (1990).
206. See supraPart Ill.B.
207. See infra notes 213-33 and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., HORDER, supra note 15, at 7-9 (observing that medieval juries first developed
informal provocation rules to temper the effects of extremely restrictive self-defense principles and
that the seventeenth century official doctrine "was fashioned almost exactly in accordance with the
medieval juries' understanding of. . . excusable homicide").
209. HORDER, supra note 15, at 7-9; Ashworth, supra, note 32, at 292; Bernard Brown, The
Demise of Chance Medley and the Recognition of Provocation as a Defence to Murder in English
Law, 7 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 310,310-11 (1963).
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penalty. 21 0 By the seventeenth century, courts solidified the legal doctrine of
provocation, and defendants claimed provocation as a matter of course to rebut
211
the presumption that they acted with malice and evade execution.
Consequently, history shows that the primary purpose of the doctrine was
literally to mitigate the harsh effects of an unforgiving legislative regime.212
According to experts, the doctrine continued to function as a counterweight to
popular penal tendencies well into the nineteenth century:
Reflection on this period suggests that while Parliament continued to
increase the number of capital offenses, and political rhetoric required
the toughest approach to crime, the judiciary sought to mitigate the
severity of legislation. The emergence of the doctrine of provocation
213
is ... one example of this tendency.
A feminist critic might counter that even if subordinating women was not
the doctrine's primary purpose, women nonetheless had to bear the cost of the
judiciary's liberal tendencies. Because the doctrine was only available to men
whose violent reactions fit the cultural standard, it inevitably benefitted
murderous men who engaged in chastising violence against women.2 14 Even
this account, however, does not appear to be a completely accurate historical
depiction of the doctrine. Feminist critics base their claim that provocation is
about the domestic control of women primarily on two sources, the
seventeenth-century Manning's Case215 and eighteenth-century Regina v.
216
Mawgridge case. In Manning's Case, the court stated that there "could not
be greater provocation" than adultery,2 17 and in Mawgridge, the court, in dicta,
approved of adultery as a basis for provocation, calling it the "highest invasion
of property." 218 Provocation critics place an enormous amount of weight on
Manning's Case as clear evidence of the inextricable link between the

210. The provocation doctrine permitted defendants to seek the "benefit of clergy," meaning
they could avail themselves of the more lenient sentencing principles available to clergy accused of
crimes. See HORDER, supra note 15, at 13-15; see also Brown, supra note 209, at 311 (describing the
original purpose of provocation as protecting from execution defendants denied "the shelter of selfdefence" who committed a "less morally reprehensible form of homicide than that which was long
premeditated and carried out in cold blood"); Dressler, Rethinking Passion, supra note 32, at 426
(asserting that in the sixteenth century, the doctrine reflected the view that "[t]he death penalty was
viewed as an inappropriate and excessive response" to deaths occurring as a result of "drunken brawls
and breaches of honor").
211. See Ashworth, supranote 32, at 292 (contending that in the seventeenth century "[k]illings
were presumed to proceed from malice aforethought: if there was no evidence of express malice, then
the law would imply malice").
212. Cf HORDER, supra note 15, at 26-29 (contending that the formal provocation doctrine that
emerged in the seventeenth century might not actually be contiguous with past versions of provocation
and, instead, may be reflective of the unique values and practices of the time).
213. GR. BR. LAW COMM'N, supra note 76, at 299.
214. See supra Part III.A (discussing history of provocation and women's subordination).

215. [1671] 83 Eng. Rep. 112 (K.B.).
216. R. v. Mawgridge, (1706), 84 Eng. Rep. 1107, 1115 (K.B.); see supranotes 124-25.
217. 83 Eng. Rep. at 112.
218. Mawgridge, 84 Eng. Rep. at 1115.
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development of the doctrine and women's status as men's property. However,
Lord Hale's Pleas of the Crown, a seminal work in the doctrine's development,
actually does not reference the Manning's Case or the adultery category at all
in its discussion of provocation.219 Rather, Hale mentions the case only
haphazardly in an unrelated section, 220 leading one nineteenth-century English
historian to opine that Hale's discussion of the provocation doctrine reflects the
"gradual and casual manner in which a large part of [provocation] law came
into existence." 22
It is also noteworthy that in both the Manning and Mawgridge cases, the
court tolerated only male-on-male violence.222 These cases may thus reflect the
norm that men are entitled to lash out against men who seduce their women,
223
but not against women. Accordingly, the dominant gender bias evidenced by
the early English cases may actually be a woman-protecting bias.224 Indeed,
other historical research undermines the notion that wife killing was a
legitimate and socially favored form of chastisement. Rather, it demonstrates
that premodern Western culture regarded men who killed women with
particular disdain. Legal historian Carolyn Ramsey observes:
The legal treatment of murder cases in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries [in the United States] embodied two strands. The
first strand ... was the excusing sympathy of courts, juries, and the
public for supposedly damaged, hysterical females.

. .

. However, a

second and more remarkable strand existed, too: the moral
condemnation of excessively violent men. Over the course of the
nineteenth century, this strand increasingly led to murder convictions
for male defendants and more lenient treatment of wronged women

219. 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 455-57 (Philadelphia,
Robert H. Small 1847) (setting forth six illustrations of adequate and inadequate provocation).
220. Id. at 486.
221. 3 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 63
(London, MacMillan & Co. 1883) (discussing HALE).
222. Manning's Case, 83 Eng. Rep. at 112 ("Manning found the person killed committing
adultery with his wife in the very act, and flung a jointed stool at him, and with the same killed him.");
Mawgridge, 84 Eng. Rep. at 1115 (stating that "if the husband shall stab the adulterer, or knock out his
brains, this is bare manslaughter").
223. Feminist critics tend to make some logical leaps in the characterization of the historical
adultery category as reflecting a tolerance for violence against women. The traditional adultery
category excluded men who killed women, and jurists did not extend the defense to wife killers until
later. However, despite the fact that early provocation laws that did not sanction wife killing developed
at a time when the view of women as property was most strongly held, commentators still reason that
the woman-as-property norm created tolerance for wife killing. See, e.g., Sing, supra note 146, at 1868
(tracing the approval of wife killing to the view of women as property).
224. Horder cites a passage from an "honour theorist" portraying adulterous women in a
sympathetic (though objectifying) light: "I have never known a man whose heart was in the right place
bring an action for damages against another for seducing a beloved wife.... For these and such like
offences the law can make no adequate retribution." HORDER, supra note 15, at 39 (quoting
ABRAHAM BOSQUETT, THE YOUNG MAN OF HONOUR'S VADE-MECUM 17 (London, C. Chapple
1817)).
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charged with killing their abusers.225
Such a protective and paternalistic bias is itself objectifying, stereotyping,
and fully compatible with the concept of women as property. It reflects the
notion that women are not legal subjects at all, but rather mere objects over
which true legal subjects (husbands and male paramours) battle.226 One might
think of many other problems with viewing all women as weak, nonviolent,
perpetual victims.227 Nevertheless, this type of gender bias is a far cry from the
pro-wife-killing bias that provocation critics seem to believe underlies the
221
defense.
Moreover, according to English provocation law expert A.J.
Ashworth, the early cases evidence a keen awareness of the distinction between
sudden provocation and killings that follow a preexisting course of conduct or
emanate from a preexisting intent (like the intent to chastise).229
It may nonetheless seem fair to characterize the law's condoning of male230
on-male violence as indivisibly bound up with notions of honor.
Yet, even
this account may underdescribe the doctrine's historical underpinnings. While
the early cases that endorsed killings based on dignity affronts or witnessed
adultery gave a nod to the fragile male ego, masculine honor fails to account
for the category of witnessing unlawful arrest. 23 ' English judicial authorities
endorsed the category on the ground that "if a man be unduly arrested or
restrained of his liberty ...
this is a provocation to all other men of
England." 232 This skepticism of governmental authority led jurists to apply the
unlawful arrest category to defendants who resisted such arrest, even when, at
the time of resistance, they were unaware of the illegality.233 Compare this

225. Carolyn B. Ramsey, Provoking Change: ComparativeInsights on FeministHomicide Law

Reform,

100 J. CRIM. L.

& CRIMINOLOGY 33,43 (2010).

226. See HORDER, supra note 15, at 39 (observing that the offensive act consisted of "seduction
of a man's wife" by another man, rather than the wife's choice to commit adultery).
227. See Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal UnderstandingofBias: On Devaluation and
BiasedPrototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 747, 786 (2001) (observing the "patriarchal norms" that women
are "passive, modest, and under male protection"); Melanie Randall, Domestic Violence and the
Construction of "Ideal Victims": Assaulted Women's "Image Problems" in Law, 23 ST. Louis U.
PUB. L. REV. 107, 154 (2004) (noting 'the discourses which construct women as damaged,
helpless . .
victims"); infra Part IV.D. 1. See generally Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women,

82 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1994).
228. See supra note 28 & Part IIIA.
229. Ashworth, supra note 32, at 294. Ashworth cites to Maddy's Case and notes that the judge
instructed the jury to convict of murder if they found that Maddy acted on a previous plan of revenge.

Id. (citing Regina v. Maddy, 1 Vent. 158 (1671) reprinted sub. nom. Regina v. Manning, [1671] 83
Eng. Rep. 112 (K.B.)).
230. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
231. But see HORDER, supra note 15, at 34 (opining that refraining from intervening in a false
arrest would sully a man-of-honor's reputation). However, this does not explain why a court would
approve resisting an arrest that the defendant did not know was illegal. See infra note 233 and
accompanying text.

232. Ashworth, supra note 32, at 293 (quoting Hopkin Huggett's Case (1666) 84 Eng. Rep.
1082 (K.B.)).
233. Id. at 293-94 (citing Queen v. Tooley (1709) 92 Eng. Rep. 349 (K.B.); 2 Ld. Raym.
1296.).
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seventeenth-century English suspicion of state authority to arrest to the current
laws in most American states explicitly forbidding citizens to resist unlawful
arrest. 234

Is the provocation defense ultimately a liberty-loving doctrine? Is it a
male chauvinist doctrine? Does it have a venerable history? Does it have a
condemnable history? The answer is yes. The history of the provocation
doctrine, like many laws, includes all these attributes and likely more. Whether
one views provocation as historically benign or malignant depends on the
aspects of the doctrine's history one chooses to emphasize. Thus, analyzing the
history of the provocation defense neither demonstrates its inherent neutrality
nor proves its fundamental sexism.
B. ProvocationLaw Does Not Necessarily Underpunish Culpable Men in
Noteworthy Numbers
Even if the historical picture does not establish provocation as an
unequivocally sexist doctrine, provocation critics can still argue that the current
legal regime is defectively chauvinistic because it shelters culpable male
murderers.235 At the outset, an extremely defense-oriented commentator might
dispute that the class of male defendants about whom feminists are concerned
is as culpable as some other classes of killers. One could, for example, combine
the factual observation that wife killers are impassioned, angry, and hurt with
the determinist claim that they are not responsible for having obsessive and
236
dependent personalities (perhaps they had been abused as children).
Accordingly, it is possible to distinguish the damaged, emotionally wounded,
masculinity-norm influenced, heartbroken man who lashed out from, say,
Sammy "the Bull" Gravano, who killed for money.237
Moreover, the concept of average culpability for murder is fairly
unintelligible. All killings exist upon an intuitive, communal, legally
conditioned, and socially constructed spectrum from desirable (a soldier killing

234. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-304(4) (West 2008) (a person may not use force to
"resist an arrest which the actor knows is being made by a law enforcement officer"); see MARC L.
MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: THE POLICE 382 (4th ed. 2011) ("[M]ost
states now require citizens to submit to unlawful arrests by police officers-about a dozen through
judicial opinions and roughly another twenty states through statutes.").
235. See supraPart Ill.B.
236. See Daniella Levine, Children in Violent Homes: Effects and Responses, FLA. B.J., Oct.
1994, at 62, 63 (noting that in a study of batterers, 73 percent of men reported having been physically
or sexually abused as children); cf Nancy Ehrenreich, Subordinationand Symbiosis: Mechanisms of
Mutual Support Between SubordinatingSystems, 71 UMKC L. REV. 251, 291-300 (2002) (explaining
that domestic violence may occur when lower-status men "subordinate others in order to compensate
for their own vulnerability and powerlessness").
237. See John J. Goldman, Gotti Accuser Sentenced to Five Years in Plea Deal, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 27, 1994, http://articles.latimes.com/1994-09-27/news/mn-43689_lorganized-crime (noting
that Sammy "the Bull" was sentenced to five years for his involvement in nineteen murders in
exchange for testifying against mobster Jon Gotti).
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an enemy?) to ultimately heinous (Jeffrey Dahmer?) with plenty of room for
238
retributivist debate over where any given killer should fit on the spectrum.
Why is it so easy to claim that battered women who kill abusers are innocents
and, yet, so difficult to contest that a gang member, who grew up in gang
culture and kills a rival gang member, commits deliberate murder? 239 There are
a host of racialized, gendered, class-based, socially constructed, and
idiosyncratic assumptions, fears, and values that influence seemingly objective
retributive intuitions.240 Add to this multiple "interpretive constructions," such
as broad versus narrow time framing, and determining levels of culpability
becomes a next-to-impossible task. 24' Nevertheless, I will fully accept the
claim that sexist men who kill their partners are culpable for murder. Even so,
it is still possible to defend against the claim that provocation law
underpunishes this class of murderers.

238. See R.A. Duff, Penal Communications: Recent Work in the Philosophy ofPunishment, in
20 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1, 7-8 (Michael Tonry ed., 1995) ("The central
problem for a retributivist . .. is to explain this idea of desert. . . . How does crime call for punishment
or make punishment appropriate? It is not enough simply to appeal to the supposedly shared intuition
that the guilty deserve to suffer, since such an intuition, however widely shared, needs explanation.")
(citations omitted).
239. Political leaders regularly grant pardons to women convicted of killing their partners when
there is evidence of abuse. See, e.g., Chris Kenning, Some Abused Women Get Pardons, COURIER-J.
(Dec. 10, 2007, 3:34 AM), http://archive.courier-journal.com/article/20071210/NEWS01/712100398
("Gov. Ernie Fletcher granted clemency, pardons or early parole reviews yesterday to twenty-one
Kentucky women convicted of killing or trying to kill men they say abused them."); Isabel Wilkerson,
Clemency Granted to 25 Women Convicted for Assault or Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1990,
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/12/22/us/clemency-granted-to-25-women-convicted-for-assault-or
("Gov.
-murder.html?n=Top2fReference2ffimes20Topics2fSubjects2fA2fAmnestiesandPardons
Richard F. Celeste of Ohio granted clemency today to 25 women who had been convicted of killing or
assaulting husbands or companions who the women said had physically abused them."). Yet, they find
it incredibly difficult to view people like gang members as victims. See, e.g., Bill Clinton, U.S.
President, Address in Support of a Victims' Rights Amendment (June 25, 1996), available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/law/jan-june96/victim_06-25.html ("We sure don't want to
give criminals like gang members, who may be victims of their associates, any way to take advantage
of these rights just to slow the criminal justice process down.").
240. There is a plethora of social science research demonstrating that people's determinations
of culpability are racialized. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and
Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 876 (2004) ("The stereotype of Black
Americans as violent and criminal has been documented by social psychologists for almost 60
years."); id. at 885-87 (reporting that a research subject, after being primed with crime-related words
or photographs, paid more attention to black than white faces); Ronald Mazzella & Alan Feingold, The
Effects of PhysicalAttractiveness, Race, Socioeconomic Status, and Gender of Defendants and Victims
on Judgments ofMock Jurors:A Meta-Analysis, 24 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1315, 1315 (mock jury
study finding that "[i]n general, it was advantageous for defendants to be physically attractive, female,
and of high [socioeconomic status]"); Tara L. Mitchell et al., Racial Bias in Mock Juror DecisionMaking: A Meta-Analytic Review ofDefendant Treatment, 29 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 621, 621 (2005)
(completing meta-analysis of existing race and juror decision-making studies and concluding that race
has a "significant" effect on jurors' decisions).
241. See Kelman, supra note 41, at 646-47 (focusing on arbitrary temporal lines accepted by
retributivism that exclude considerations of a defendant's background).
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The thrust of many of the critiques is that provocation relieves sexist
intimate killers of murder liability at unacceptable levels.242 This, of course,

begs the threshold question of what is an unacceptable level. One might reply
that even one sexist defendant who succeeds in his provocation defense is
unacceptable and cite the facts of a particular heinous case to support this
243
contention.
However, all legal rules operate within a cultural milieu and
occasionally produce undesirable results. Pointing to an unwanted result is but
part of the argument. There must be another part of the equation articulating the
threshold at which production of unsatisfactory results requires legal reform.
Otherwise, the progressive feminist position on provocation is
indistinguishable from the tough-on-crime, conservative tactic of exposing
individual cases of leniency toward "monstrous" offenders as a ground to
244
dismantle the entire system of criminal defense protections.
Provocation critics assume that exonerations of sexist men occur in
substantial or at least noteworthy numbers, but they provide little evidence in
support.245 The data set from the 1996 Passion's Progress resembles the
closest thing to confirmation by trying to demonstrate that defendants who
asserted that they were provoked at least in part by the victim's attempt to leave
are extremely successful at getting their claims to the jury under the MPC's
246
EED law. For there to be an underpunishment problem, however, juries must
largely accept these claims and decide to mitigate. In the majoritarian strain
where the provocation defense itself perpetuates gender bias in favor of wife
killers, juries feel compelled to mitigate even though they find the men
despicable.247 It is difficult to see how the language of EED compels a jury to
act against their condemnatory impulses. The defense requires a "reasonable
explanation or excuse" for the defendant's conduct, and thus, a jury could
easily find the sexist defendant was unreasonable.24 8 If the reasonableness
requirement is defined subjectively, juries must adopt the defendant's point of

242. See supraPart III.B.
243. See supranotes 126-28 and accompanying text (discussing the use of narrative).
244. For example, the victims' rights movement relies on the language of underpunishment to
push for "longer sentences and fewer procedural protections for defendants." Tom Lininger, Bearing

the Cross, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 1353, 1396 (2005); see also Ann E. Freedman, Fact-Findingin Civil
Domestic Violence Cases: Secondary TraumaticStress and the Needfor Compassionate Witnesses, 11
AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 567, 588 (2003) ("Dramatic cases and 'tough on crime' policies
are easily communicated in the mass media and have ready appeal to voters."); Aya Gruber, A
Distributive Theory of Criminal Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 44 (2010) (noting that focusing on
horrific offenses and the plight of victims leads policy makers to "eliminate defense-friendly rules that
impede convictions, and ensure 'adequate' punishment."); Carrie T. Hollister, The Impossible

Predicament of Gina Grant, 44 UCLA L. REV. 913, 923-24 (1997) (noting in the juvenile justice
context that media coverage of "repeat offenders committing horrifically violent crimes" led to a
restructuring of the juvenile justice system to be "tough on crime").

245. See supraPart III.B.
246. See supranotes 148-49 and accompanying text.
247. See supranotes 152-53 and accompanying text.
248. See supranote 45 and accompanying text (discussing EED).
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view to some extent.249 Even then, jurors that disbelieve and detest the
defendant would have plenty of grounds to convict (they could, for example,
find that there was no real emotional disturbance or the defendant lied about
the alleged provoking act). To be sure, social science research on the subject
confirms that jurors predisposed to convict are not dissuaded by instructions
about the nuances of law. 250
The alternative account is that juries do not need convincing to mitigate
the charges of sexist defendants. In the anti-majoritarian strain, our culture
somewhat forgives jealous and controlling husbands who kill due to biases
infused in society, and the law must be reformed to check the majority's
discriminatory tendencies.25 But this strain may not reflect reality. The scant
evidence that exists on whether sexist defendants who concern feminists
actually prevail on provocation indicates that they do not. In 2004, psychologist
Stuart Kirschner and his colleagues published a paper analyzing all EED claims
in New York County over a ten-year period.252 They reported:
[I]t is clearly true that in an EED jurisdiction, such as New York,
defendants charged with murdering an actual or desired intimate
partner because the victim left (or refused) a relationship can
sometimes argue an EED defense before a jury. However, our data-and reported New York decisions-suggest that such claims for
mitigation are very rarely successful. In 12 of our cases, the defendant
killed a then current or former intimate partner. In only one of these
cases was the EED defense successful (by plea agreement after the
prosecution's expert concluded that the defendant met the legal
standard for an EED defense). While we do not have data on all the
passion homicides (or attempted passion homicides) that were
committed in New York County during the ten-year period that we
investigated, it is certain that there were far more than twelve such
cases, making the utility of an EED defense in such circumstances
even more rare. 253

249. The MPC states, "The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be determined
from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes them to
be." MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1980).
250. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: JurorInstructions in
Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 10-13 (1993) (studying South Carolina capital jurors and
finding that they misunderstood jury instructions and such confusion actually enhanced their bias
toward conviction and execution).
251. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
252. Stuart M. Kirschner et al., The Defense ofExtreme Emotional Disturbance:A Qualitative
Analysis of Cases in New York County, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 102 (2004).
253. Id. at 126 (internal citations omitted). When faced with such evidence, critics argue that
juries have become enlightened despite the formal law's failings. See, e.g., Forell, Gender Equality,
supra note 25, at 61-63. Critics also fail to entertain the possibility that there was never the widespread
leniency they presumed existed.
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In Kirschner's study, prevailing EED defendants were generally those facing
254
some physical threat.
For example, one successful EED case involved a
sixty-seven-year-old double amputee killing a younger male who had
repeatedly bullied him and extorted money from him.255
If Kirschner's study is representative of larger empirical trends, we are
left with the contention that judges allow many sexist killers to argue
256
provocation to juries, and this, in itself, is problematic.
Even accepting the
257

empirical observation as accurate,
it is difficult to see how "reaching the
jury" is an underenforcement problem, with its concurrent retributive
difficulties (the guilty are not punished) and utilitarian issues (people are
encouraged to commit such killings), if in fact juries convict these defendants.
The problem of judges "condoning" sexist provocation claims, it seems, is an
expressive one. Critics contend that the very fact that judges permit such
defendants to argue heat of passion expresses a negative message, regardless of
the jury verdict. 258 Section D addresses the expressivist argument below.
In any case, this inquiry should not end with establishing that the absolute
number of sexist defendants' provocation claims that reach the jury or result in
mitigation is undesirable. One should also question whether the cost of that
number of sexist defendants receiving a pass outweighs the benefits of a broad
provocation defense. Of course, this is an impossibly obtuse query because
analysts are likely to diverge on what counts as a benefit. Would provocation
critics see increasing the chances of a murder conviction for defendants who
are not in the disfavored class (i.e., women defendants, men who kill men, etc.)
as a cost or benefit? 259 Moreover, there are likely to be many disagreements
about the threshold at which costs outweigh benefits.260 My instinct, however,

254. Kirschner et al., supra note 252, at 130.
255. Id. at 120.
256. See supranotes 109-11 and accompanying text.
257. A quick perusal of intimate homicide cases on Westlaw demonstrates (albeit only
anecdotally and unscientifically) that judges are quite willing to deny a defendant's voluntary
manslaughter instruction requests. A search for intimate homicide provocation cases revealed 753
appellate cases involving denials of requests, 572 in which the court affirmed the denial, and 181 in
which the court reversed the denial. Reversals were more common in cases with female defendants
(31.6 percent) than in cases with male defendants (23.3 percent). See also Kirschner et al., supra note
252, at 126 ("[A] number of New York court decisions have upheld jury or judicial verdicts rejecting
claims of FED in cases involving the murder of former or desired partners.") (internal citations
omitted).
258. But see Forell, Gender Equality, supra note 25, at 44-45 (attributing the tendency of
provocation claims to reach the jury to Americans' "distrust of government" and prioritization of
individual rights).
259. See LEE, supra note 9, at 277-78 (intimating that ratcheting up for such individuals is not a
cost because they have taken another's life).
260. For example, a dominance feminist might consider maximizing women's protection
against violence as essential to dismantling male supremacy and therefore would wish to pursue it at
all costs. See, e.g., ANDREA DWORKIN & CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, PORNOGRAPHY AND CIVIL
RIGHTS: A NEW DAY FOR WOMEN'S EQUALITY 23 (1988) ("Equality means someone loses
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is that most progressive provocation critics would be keener on the defense if
provided with compelling evidence that mitigation for sexist abusers is rare, but
narrowing provocation laws will significantly burden subordinated defendants,
exacerbate mass incarceration, and bolster the penal state.
Although there is little empirical evidence addressing exactly who
prevails on provocation and the doctrine's general effect on sentences, murder
sentencing regimes and the demographics of murder defendants provide insight
into the law's impact. I have written on this extensively in another article, and
261
will only mention it here.
Proposals to limit the provocation defense seek to
increase murder convictions in a system that, over the past several decades, has
262
seen skyrocketing murder sentences and the decimation of parole.
In
fairness, some feminist critics couple their arguments for narrowing
provocation with a call to reform the over-punitive sentencing structure.263
Others, however, concentrate only on how reformed law might affect sexist
264
intimate killers and largely disregard the broader impacts of their proposals.
Sexist wife killers are not the only defendants who might benefit from
provocation. According to Department of Justice statistics, from 1980 to 2008,
male-on-female intimate killings comprised less than 10 percent of all
homicides. 265 After examining the demographic information, I have concluded
elsewhere that "the group most likely to be burdened by the elimination or
limitation of the provocation defense is young men of color accused of nonintimate homicides and facing murder charges in one of the most punitive
systems on earth." 266
C. ProvocationLaw Does Not NecessarilyFormally DiscriminateAgainst
Women
Provocation critics often purport to adopt a liberal formal equality
267
261
framework that forbids law to treat men better than women and vice versa.
In essence, provocation doctrine should regard "similarly situated" male and

power.... The mathematics are simple: taking power from the exploiters extends and multiplies the
rights of those they have been exploiting.").
261. See generally, Gruber, Murder, supra note 32, at Part IV.B.
262. See id. (citing statutes).
263. See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 122, at 364 n.1 1; Ramsey, supra note 225, at 90 (noting
provocation critics' concerns over "totally abolishing the provocation doctrine in the United States,
without concurrent changes to our draconian sentencing structure").
264. See sources cited supra note 2 1.
265. See Gruber,Murder, supranote 32, at 183-84 (citing ALExIACOOPER& ERICAL. SMITH,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES,

1980-2008, at 10, 18 (2011)).
266. Id. at 185.
267. The term liberal, in this section, refers to the legal theory that prioritizes rights, formal
equality, and autonomy, rather than a general left-leaning political view.
268. See Mary Becker, Patriarchyand Inequality: Towards a Substantive Feminism, 1999 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 21, 32-33 (1999) (observing that in liberal feminism, "[t]he solution to inequality
between women and men is to offer individuals the same choices regardless of sex").
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female defendants similarly. Critical legal scholars have exhaustively critiqued
formal equality in many contexts. They assert, inter alia, that liberal equality
does not ensure substantive justice, that "sameness" is indeterminate, and that
269
formal legal rules operate in the shadow of preexisting social arrangements.
In fact, second-wave feminists have persuasively argued that "[1]egal equality
analysis 'runs out' when it encounters 'real' difference, and only becomes
available if and when the difference is analogized to some experience men can
have too."

270

Thus, while frequently claiming to ground their critique in

"equality," provocation critics actually find it difficult to support proposals that
equally thwart or equally enable male and female defendants' provocation
Afmns
claims. 271 Instead,
feminist critics generally tailor their analyses to account for
the fact that male and female defendants and victims are inherently differently
situated. The problem, as we will see below, is that once critics abandon formal
equality, the feminist critique has a tendency to reduce to the notion that we
should simply do whateverfavors the (identified) woman in any given case.272
1.

Female Defendants Are More Successful at Claiming Provocationthan
Male Defendants

One of provocation critics' most persistent assumptions is that the defense
inequitably favors male over female defendants. They assert the doctrine
excuses only masculine violence provoked by affronts to male dignity.273 It

does not necessarily accommodate women who, according to critics, kill out of
fear, depression, and frustration based on different types of provoking
274
behavior.
Accordingly, commentators reason that male defendants must
benefit disproportionately from the defense.275 The durable nature of this
argument is particularly astounding given that the empirical evidence has never
demonstrated that men are more successful at defending on provocation

269. See BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 21 (1984) (contending
that liberal feminism "aims to grant women greater equality of opportunity within the present white
supremacist capitalist, patriarchal state"); Duncan Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in CriticalLegal
Studies, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 181, 182 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002)
(observing that liberalism adopts a "special" view of equality that does not "involve the demand for
equality in the distribution of income or wealth between social classes, regions, or communities" but
"equal protection" for members of certain groups); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual
Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1279, 1307 (1987) (noting the critique that formal equality does not
"challenge[] the assumed gender-neutrality of social institutions"); see also Aya Gruber, Neofeminism,
50 HouS. L. REV. 1325, 1332-38 (2013) (discussing liberal feminism and its critics).
270. See Littleton, supra note 269, at 1306.
27 1. See infra Part IV.C.2.
272. See, e.g., Forell, GenderEquality, supra note 25, at 29-30 (rejecting "formal equality" and
proposing to apply "substantive equality [which] would mean that killing in a heat of passion out of
sexual possessiveness would no longer be an acceptable basis for a claim of provocation" but "killing
one's batterer out of fear would often be a basis for self-defense").
273. See supranotes 78-79 and accompanying text.
274. See supranotes 80-81 and accompanying text.
275. See supranotes 157-64 and accompanying text.
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276
grounds than women.276 If anything,
the opposite is true. 277 Women defendants
are more successful at defending against murder charges than men, just as they
are more successful in defending against most crimes and obtaining favorable
sentences.27 8
How feminist critics frame the issue may explain the persistence of the
belief that provocation favors male over female defendants. Feminist
provocation critics view a man's voluntary manslaughter conviction as an
undeserved victory but regard a woman's voluntary manslaughter conviction as

an unjust defeat.279 The problem is that the doctrine gives male defendants a

benefit they do not deserve (mitigation) and denies female defendants a better
disposition (acquittal).280 Consequently, even if the provocation defense
276. See HORDER, supra note 15, at 187 (acknowledging that the "bare statistics" reveal that "it
is easier for women than for men to 'get off with manslaughter on the grounds of provocation when
charged with murder"). Commentators rely on surprisingly little evidence, mainly in the form of
random anecdote, to level this charge of disparity. For example, a 2010 note critical of provocation
bluntly states, 'Today, voluntary manslaughter continues to accommodate men who kill their wives in
the heat of passion, but not women who kill their husbands for the same reason." See Miller, supra
note 76, at 250. As support for this general empirical observation, the author relies solely on a 1994
newspaper article that compares the case of a New York man sentenced to eighteen months
imprisonment for the voluntary manslaughter of his unfaithful wife and a contemporaneous Baltimore
case in which a woman who pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter for killing her abusive husband
received a sentence of three years. See id. at 250 n.13. Later, however, the author acknowledges that
the gender effects of provocation are "unclear" and more studies are needed. Id. at 252.
277. See PATRICK A. LANGAN & JOHN M. DAWSON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPOUSE MURDER DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES iii-iv (1995)
(conducting study of spousal homicide cases in 1988 in the seventy-five largest urban counties and
discovering that female defendants were convicted less often, given lower sentences, and that
unprovoked female convicts received on average ten years less time than unprovoked male convicts);
Ramsey, supra note 225, at 43 (noting that historically "women in United States, Britain, and Australia
have been acquitted of murder more often than their male counterparts").
278. See generally Laurie L. Ragatz & Brenda Russell, Sex, Sexual Orientation, and Sexism:
Wat Influence Do These FactorsHave on Verdicts in a Crime-of-PassionCase?, 4 J. SOC. PSYCHOL.
341 (2010) (conducting a study involving mock-passion killings and finding that "heterosexual female
defendants were less guilty and received the shortest sentences" and "[b]enevolent sexism contributed
significantly to guilt perceptions"); see also Amy Farrell, Geoff Ward & Danielle Rousseau,
Intersections of Gender and Race in FederalSentencing: Examining Court Contexts and the Effects of
Representative Court Authorities, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 85, 85-86 (2010) ("[L]eniency toward
women has become an almost accepted phenomenon among scholars studying criminal case
processing."); Schmall, supra note 137, at 288 (noting that women receive disproportional lenity in
sentencing).
279. See, e.g., HORDER, supra note 15, at 187 (opining that because a "very large percentage of
women facing a murder charge .. . have themselves been battered" the disproportion in favor of
women should be higher); Milgate, supra note 21, at 194-95 & 227 (calling for a "reevaluation" of the
provocation doctrine based on the comparison of a case in which a male defendant who killed his
girlfriend's paramour was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, and a case in which a woman who
killed her abusive husband was sentenced to life in prison).
280. The following passage represents this logic:
Men who commit domestic homicide by killing intimate or former intimate partners often
do so out of jealousy, possessiveness, and rage in the heat of passion. Women who
commit domestic homicide often kill out of fear and despair they kill their batterers. Both
men and women frequently assert the partial defense of provocation for this ultimate act of
domestic violence. . . . Two gender equality issues are presented by this reality, both
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disproportionately mitigates the charges of female defendants, critics retain the
feeling that it is male-friendly and female-unfriendly. Now, it could be that the
majority of men who prevail on their provocation claims do not deserve it, and
the majority of women who prevail on provocation actually deserved
acquittal. 281' However, the question of what any given defendant deserves is
distinct from the issue of disparity. 28 2 Discrimination claims rest on the logic
that similarly situated individuals should be treated similarly.283 When male
and female defendants, at the outset, are assumed to be disparately deserving of
exoneration, the entire equality argument simply evaporates into a larger
normative debate about how provocation law should operate.2 84 Therefore, it
seems that provocation critics simply "refer[] to 'equal protection under the
law' as if it were a plateglass solution to the dilemma of 'protect[ing]
threatened and abused women without waiting for them to kill or be killed,'
without telling us what guidance the invocation gives."2 85
Critics censor the provocation defense for adopting a "male" perspective
of aggression and argue that equality demands reform of this perspective.286
The law, critics contend, should not condone the reasoning of aggressive men
287
and allow their defense attorneys to put women victims on trial.
At the same
time, critics aspire to a provocation doctrine that vigilantly scrutinizes male
victims' behavior in order to put female defendants' cases in their proper
"context." 288 Thus, "equality" apparently means that provocation law should
disregard men's reasons for killing and women's precipitating behavior but
carefully consider women's reasons for killing and men's precipitating
behavior. Catharine MacKinnon explains:
Put starkly, if someone comes at you with a raised knife and you shoot,
you may commit self-defense. Slowly poisoning a person who
repeatedly threatens you with a raised knife over a period of years
looks more like murder. In a feminist context, women may be justified
relating to domestic violence. First, why should jealous killers be allowed to argue
provocation when their victims did nothing legally wrong? Second, why are most battered
women who kill their batterers not fully excused based on self-defense?
Forell, GenderEquality, supra note 25, at 28-29 (internal citations omitted).
281. Critics make a statistical argument that the majority of women provocation defendants are
abuse victims while the majority of men are otherwise violent. See, e.g., HORDER, supra note 15, at
187.
282. See Burke, supra note 143, at 1067 (asserting that the "political view" that more male-onfemale intimate homicides should be punished as murder has nothing to do with neutralizing bias).
283. See supranote 268 and accompanying text.
284. Some critics attempt to rehabilitate equality analysis by arguing that "substantive" equality
demands that women defendants are treated more leniently and male defendants are treated more
harshly. See, e.g., Forell, Gender Equality, supra note 25, at 29-30. But this simply begs the question
of why substantive equality prescribes a proposal to treat men and women differently.
285. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence,34 STAN. L. REV. 703, 731
(1982) [hereinafter Jurisprudence].
286. See supranotes 21 & 99 and accompanying text.
287. See supranote 19 and accompanying text.
288. See supranotes 79-80 and accompanying text.
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in both on a broad self-defense rationale. But, as a matter of fairness, if
you can look into why she poisoned him, from her point of view,
might you not also look at why he came at her with a knife from his?
What is incitement and where does it divide from response? Social acts
may not be so discrete, if one takes point of view into account. If to
him, she was a nag or sleeping around, and that enrages men, how is
that differently relevant than if, to her, he never listened and acted out
jealous rages? If the circumstances mitigate her culpability, why is it
not equitable to accord him the same? Seeing both from the victim's
standpoint, the usual view in feminist critique, becomes less instantly
compelling when she killed him. 28 9

In the end, provocation equality arguments fall prey to the same chronic defect
as other formal equality claims-they ultimately beg the question of a larger
vision of the good. 290 The directive to treat people equally simply fails to
meaningfully distinguish between similarly situated and differently situated
individuals, whether to treat people identically or disparately, and when
291
difference means injustice and when it means liberation.
2.

Leniency Toward Male Offenders Is Not Inherently Badfor Women

Provocation critics often sidestep some of the thorny issues above by
bypassing questions of the relative effects of provocation on similarly situated
male and female defendants; instead critics focus on the absolute effects of the
defense on the genders writ large. Sometimes the logic is that the defense on
the whole is bad for women because women are more often homicide victims
292
than defendants.
Sometimes critics assert that men disproportionately benefit
from the provocation defense because the vast majority of homicide defendants
are men.293 Thus, the crux of the absolute disparity objection is that women's
interests are synonymous with victims' interests (because criminals are rarely
women) and men's interests are synonymous with defendants' interests
(because criminals are often men).294
However, tethering women's equality interests to crime victims'
(perceived) interests in harsh retribution 29 turns each instance of leniency
289. MacKinnon, Jurisprudence,supra note 285, at 727-28.
290. See supra notes 269-70 and accompanying text.
291. See Nourse, supra note 122, at 365 (asserting that equal treatment of male and female
provocation defendants creates "odd results in a world where inequality is not formal and obvious, but
embedded and structural").
292. See supra Part IV.C.2.
293. See id.
294. In reality, women are rarely victims of crime or criminal defendants. Men, especially men
of color, are disproportionately both victims of crime and criminal defendants. See generally ALEXIA
COOPER & ERICA L. SMITH, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, HOMICIDE
TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980-2008 (2011).

295. One might argue that victims do not actually benefit from harsh punishment of offenders.
See MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE USE AND ABUSE OF VICTIMS'
RIGHTS

26 (2006).
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toward a male defendant into a case of discrimination against women. Under
this reasoning, every time a male is successful at defending against state
authority, it exacerbates inequality because there are not enough women
296
defendants to similarly benefit from the law's leniency.
But take a temporal
step back. Maybe women are disproportionately acculturated to noncriminal
297
behavior.
Maybe women are disproportionately spared policing and
298
Maybe criminal laws disproportionately criminalize male but
prosecution.
not female behavior because men have historically been the true legal
subjects.299 Thus, provocation critics, it seems, simply choose hyper-punitivity
within the existing cultural and legal structure as the principle way to account
for men's and women's differing levels of criminality.
Nearly all provocation critics set forth ratchet-up proposals that make it
more difficult for defendants to obtain mitigation. 300 However, any differences
between male and female defendants' chances of success could arguably be
leveled by ratcheting down and broadening the law to encompass behavior
provoking to women and men, as Laurie Taylor suggests.30 ' It is true that
disparities that regard the general criminality of men and women seem to be
remediable only through ratchet-up solutions.302 Even so, if one adopts the
view that provocation is always good for men and bad for women, abolition
does not level the playing field but simply reverses the disparity. 303 To be sure,
feminist commentary on criminal law tends to ignore disparity and stereotyping
that lead to sympathy toward women and severity toward men and only

296. See Dressler, supra note 13, at 977 ("That the provocation defense is primarily invoked by
males is an insufficient reason to repeal it unless we are prepared as well to call into question all the
other defenses . . that are more often claimed by men than by women.").
297. See MacKinnon, Jurisprudence,supra note 285, at 731 ("Women are socially discouraged
from physical engagement."); Kavita B. Ramakrishnan, Inconsistent Legal Treatment of Unwanted
Sexual Advances: A Study of the Homosexual Advance Defense, Street Harassment, and Sexual
Harassment in the Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 291, 314 (2011) (observing that
"[m]en learn from an early age that aggression is an acceptable and even admirable form of conflict
resolution" whereas women "are socialized to be passive and submissive in the face of unwanted
advances").
298. See supranotes 276-77 (discussing disproportionate leniency toward women).
299. See supra notes 223-26 (noting the historical legal treatment of women as objects over
which men dispute).
300. See supranotes 129-33 and accompanying text.
301. See supranote 84 and accompanying text.
302. See supraPart III.C.2.
303. The articles do not actually do the simple math on this point, but let us try it. Assume the
world of intimate homicides consists of 50 female-on-male killings and 100 male-on-female killings.
In this world, the provocation defense has a net benefit of 50 for men (100 defendants minus 50
victims) and a net burden of 50 (100 victims minus 50 defendants) for women. Abolishing the defense,
however, would simply invert the disproportion and women would benefit by 50 and men would
suffer by 50. Consequently, in this bounded hypothetical world, the sole means of eliminating
disparity would be to reduce the effectiveness of the provocation defense by 50 percent. Assuming this
affected all genders equally, the change would produce the following results: 75 women benefitted (25
defendants and 50 victims), 75 women burdened (25 defendants and 50 victims), 75 men benefitted
(50 defendants and 25 victims), and 75 men burdened (50 defendants and 25 victims).
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censures differential treatment that tangibly detriments women.304 It rarely
counters the women-protecting bias inherent in provocation law and criminal
law in general, which is deeply tied to women's historical objectification.3 05
Martha Minow observes:
[Fleminists have pushed for greater retribution, including criminal
prosecutions, for violence done to women, and more caring, empathic
responses to women who risk criminal charges for their own conduct.
This pattern smacks not only of inconsistency, but also of unreflective
306
desires simply to advance what is good for women.
Provocation critics' female supremacist inclinations are apparent from the
very framing of the discrimination question 307that is, provocation law must
be reformed to condemn male perpetrators and exonerate female perpetrators.
Provocation law must be reformed to ensure that female victims see retribution
and that male decedents are not treated like real victims. Critics tend to adopt
dominance feminism's view that the realm of private intimate relations is
"women's realm of collective subordination."308 In turn, men who engage in
intimate killings are presumptively abusers who acted in accordance with their
controlling behavior patterns, whereas women intimate killers are
presumptively passive responders to subordination by a violent man. Yet,
completely ignored in this framework are other affected groups: sympathetic
male defendants, who might be unfairly burdened by narrow provocation laws;
undeserving female defendants, who might be unfairly benefitted by broad
provocation laws; or any male victims. In the feminist script, these characters
simply do not exist (or are so negligible that they do not merit mention).309
Moreover, even if one were to agree that "equality" requires criminal
doctrine to be more attuned to women's interests and less attuned to men's
interests, provocation critics may be incorrect in assuming that the doctrine

304. See Margareth Etienne, Sentencing Women: Reassessing the Claims of Disparity, 14 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 73, 77 (2010) ("Not surprisingly, when men and women receive different
sentences for similar offenses, the women do not contest the apparent inequity."); cf Janet C. Hoeffel,
The Gender Gap: Revealing Inequities in Admission ofSocial Science Evidence in CriminalCases, 24
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 41 (2001) (observing that courts routinely disallow criminal
defendants, disproportionately African American and male, to introduce psychological syndrome
evidence, but generally permit the prosecution to introduce such evidence on behalf of white women
victims).
305. See supra notes 223-26, 277-78 and accompanying text (discussing woman-protecting

bias).
306. Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Feminist Responses to Violent

Injustice, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 967, 972 (1998).
307. See Janet Halley, The Politics of Injury: A Review of Robin West's Caring for Justice, 1
UNBOUND: HARv. J. LEGAL LEFT 65, 74 (2005) (finding the assertion that "exceptional human good
can be seen only 'from a truly woman- . . centered perspective"' to be "female supremacist

thinkling").
308. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD AFEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 168 (1989).
309. See, e.g., Milgate, supra note 21, at 210 (stating that "for the most part, only men actually
kill upon finding their spouses in bed with another").
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necessarily undermines women's interests and furthers men's interests and that
men and women's interests are incontestably adverse. These assumptions
ignores the very heterodox nature of provocation law's variegated effects on
the sexes. Women and men do not stand in uniform and immutable relationship
to most legal doctrines, including provocation.3 10 Men and women can be both
perpetrators and victims. In fact, one might argue that certain proposals to
ratchet up punishment in intimate homicide cases could disproportionately
burden women. 3 1' Unlike male killers, who largely kill in nonintimate settings,
female killers generally slay intimates (lovers, family members, and
children).3 12 Thus, a legal change directed toward reducing leniency in intimate
homicides increases severity in the one realm where women are most likely to
be murder defendants, leaving untouched the nondomestic homicides
perpetrated nearly exclusively by men. To be sure, women and men have
various interests that overlap, conflict, and coexist with prosecutorial and
defense interests. "Some women are the mothers, daughters, or sisters of men
facing retributive justice, even as some women are the victims of male
violence; some women are the victims of other women's violence." 313 These
observations lead to the conclusion that it is an exercise in futility to make a
generalist discrimination case against provocation. There are hundreds of manwoman combinations one could construct where current provocation law favors
the given man over the woman and hundreds of combinations where it favors
the given woman over the man.
D. ProvocationLaw Expresses VariegatedMessages
The final arrow in the feminist anti-provocation quiver is the assertion
that provocation law expresses destructive messages. At the outset, those with
left-liberal sensibilities could certainly make the case that expressivism, as a
justification for punishment, dangerously drives criminal law toward greater
punitivity. 314 Like retributivism, expressivism is a fairly vague directive that
may generate more questions than it answers.315 What should criminal
punishment symbolize? Why should it symbolize those things? Does leniency

310. See Dressler, supra note 13, at 977 (noting that the provocation defense is sometimes
utilized by women).
311. See, e.g., Stacy, supra note 128, 1048-51 (proposing to ratchet up punishment by treating
"familial obligations" as an aggravating factor).
312. See Schmall, supra note 137, at 301 (observing that "[w]hen women are violent, their
violence is usually directed against a family member" and citing statistics); Stangle, supra note 137, at
706 ("Unlike male violence, female violence often occurs within the confines of the home. The
victims of female violence are most often spouses, children, and other family members.").
313. Minow, supra note 306, at 972.
314. See, e.g., Harcourt,supra note 174.

315. See Heidi M. Hurd, Expressing Doubts About Expressivism, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 405,
428-31 (2005) (asserting that expressivists provide no satisfactory answer for why society expressing
disapproval for crime justifies the infliction of punishment).
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toward criminal actors express support for their criminal activities? 3 16
Moreover, expressivist theory does not provide a determinate method for
deriving the expressive meaning of any given criminal law.317 Accordingly, a
critic or proponent of a law can simply assert it sends a destructive or
constructive moral message because such an assertion requires very little
empiric or analytic support. 318 This makes leniency-conferring criminal
319
doctrines especially vulnerable to expressivist attack.
One can always argue
that defenses or procedural doctrines favoring defendants express approval for
their condemnable behavior. After all, it is no easy feat to dispute tautological
arguments like "harsh murder laws express disapproval of murder." 320
Moreover, focusing purely on the purported communicative function of
criminal law tends to deflect attention away from the complex socio-legal
structure in which the criminal law operates, and punishment's often
unpredictable and criminogenically escalatory effects.321

316. Some expressivism proponents seem to answer this question in the affirmative. See, e.g.,
Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 118, at 352 ("By imposing the appropriate form and degree of
affliction on a wrongdoer, the political community reaffirms its commitment to the values that the
wrongdoer's own act denies.").
317. See Gruber, Righting Wrongs, supra note 174, at 469 ("[E]xpressivism fails to answer the
important question, 'What acts ought the punishing authority condemn?'); Hurd, supra note 315, at
428 ("[E]xpressivism cannot deliver up a concept of social meaning that is coherent and determinate in
its implications for particular cases."); cf Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories ofLaw: A Skeptical
Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1369-70 (2000) (exposing the difficulty of determining what it
means to say that a law expresses a message); Steven D. Smith, Expressivist Jurisprudenceand the
Depletion ofMeaning, 60 MD. L. REV. 506, 562-63 (2001) (asserting that expressivists believe that
laws express "objective" meanings and thereby render the concept of meaning "unintelligible").
318. The same law might be described to express opposing messages (e.g., "capital punishment
condemns killing" and "capital punishment supports killing") and the same moral message might
support opposite laws. Bernard Harcourt explains, "[A] moral principle like 'lessening human
suffering' can be deployed both in support of and in opposition to capital punishment." Harcourt,
supra note 174, at 169 (emphasis in original).
319. For this reason, telling jurors to "send a message" is a favored tactic of prosecutors
nationwide. See James Joseph Duane, "at Message Are We Sending to Criminal Jurors hen We
Ask Them to 'Send a Message' With Their Verdict?, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 565, 581-82 (1995).
320. The malleability of retributive rhetoric similarly enables those holding tough-on-crime
ideals to argue that any given law inappropriately underpunishes criminals. See Kyron Huigens, "at
Is and Is Not Pathological in Criminal Law, 101 MICH. L. REV. 811, 812 (2002) (lamenting that
retributive rhetoric has justified a criminal "system of quarantine"); Erik Luna, Punishment Theory,
Holism, and the Procedural Conception of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 255-56
(2003) (asserting that retributive rhetoric "has tended to sponsor extreme policies and practices that
thoughtful retributivists themselves might well renounce") (quoting Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as
Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801, 1839 (1999)); Alice Ristroph, How (Not) to Think Like a
Punisher, 61 FLA. L. REV. 727, 747 (2009) ("[G]iven that conceptions of deserved punishment are
easier to expand than contract, sentencing policies originally motivated by utilitarian concerns may
become immune to claims of disutility once we have convinced ourselves that the sentences are
deserved.").
321. Leaping from the claim that "harsh murder laws condemn murder" to "harsh murder laws
reduce murder" happens almost unconsciously. Feinberg himself, however, was careful to divorce the
expressive function of the law from other functions. See Feinberg, supra note 174, at 101 ("Symbolic
public condemnation added to deprivation may help or hinder deterrence, reform, and rehabilitationthe evidence is not clear.").
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Perhaps incarceration skeptics might also utilize expressivist framing and
assert that severe criminal punishment expresses authoritarian values and
lenient laws symbolically support liberty. Yet, incarceration critics tend to
focus more on the distributional consequences of harsh penal laws than on what
such laws communicate in some abstract sense.322 Indeed, the trend toward
expressivist justifications of punishment dovetails with Americans' increasing
desire to communicate solidarity with victims rather than offenders.323 The
trend also finds synergy with what philosopher James Whitman identifies as a
basic social desire in contemporary society, not just to ostracize, but to degrade
324
those identified as criminals.
Expressivist theory thus provides a ready
philosophical tool for those eager to confirm criminals' statuses as evil outliers
and avoid grappling with the moral complexity of the state's increasing
325
infliction of harm and suffering on its citizens.
Consequently, critics of the
carceral state tend to view expressivist theories of punishment with a jaundiced
eye. Bernard Harcourt, for example, points out:
Punishment usually also communicates, importantly, political, cultural,
racial and ideological messages. The meaning of punishment is not so
coherent or simple. Many contemporary policing and punitive
practices, for instance, communicate a racial and political, rather than
moral, message-a message about who is in control and about who
gets controlled.326
Let us now turn to the particular expressivist arguments included in the
feminist critique of provocation.
1.

ProvocationReform May Stereotype More than Existing ProvocationLaw

Provocation critics condemn the defense for sending retrogressive
messages about men and women's natures. Indeed, even a diehard
expressivism critic could agree that antiquated, openly bigoted laws (i.e., alien
land laws) should not be on the books, regardless of whether they have fallen
327
into desuetude or are rarely enforced.
There is a powerful argument that
322. See, e.g., Harcourt,supra note 174, at 171 ("[I]nstead of isolating moral principles . . we
need to look at the distributional consequences of proposed criminal sanctions and at the type of
society, social relations, and subject that we are shaping with our policies.").
323. Markus Dirk Dubber, The Victim in American Penal Law: A Systematic Overview, 3
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 3, 9 (1999) (stating that "[t]he identification with the victim at the expense of
identifying with the offender" allows society to "deny[] any similarities with the offender" and
"transform[] the essentially ethical question of punishment into one of nuisance control").
324. James Q. Whitman, A Plea Against Retributivism, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 85, 106-07
(2003) ("Degradation in punishment is a part of human nature, which has not been successfully
abolished in the pursuit of our grand republican experiment in the United States.").
325. This may actually be what Feinberg hoped would not occur. See Feinberg,supra note 174,
at 116 (expressing a preference against corporal punishment altogether).
326. Harcourt, supra note 174, at 168.
327. Elysa Delcorto, Repeal of Alien Land Law Long Overdue, Some Say, NAPLES DAILY
NEWS (Oct. 24, 2008, 8:28 PM), http://www.naplesnews.com/news/2008/oct/24/repeal-alien-land
-law-long-overdue-some-say/ (discussing advocates' efforts to take the long-unenforceable alien land
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facially discriminatory laws are unacceptable, even if they end up having
positive social effects. 328 A law stating, for example, "men are always justified
in killing their wives," would be unacceptable even if there existed empirical
evidence that such a law actually spared subordinated men from incarceration,
prevented further degradation of at-risk communities, and surprisingly reduced
violence *against at-risk women. 329
Unlike alien land laws, however, provocation law is not facially
discriminatory. The doctrine does not explicitly endorse the view that men are
entitled to become murderously enraged by speculative evidence of infidelity
or separation. By contrast, the vast majority of provocation laws are general in
nature and leave it up to jurists and jurors to fill out the content of adequate
provocation.330 Consequently, some theorists make the somewhat mystifying
argument that broad versions of provocation silently express regressive sexist
values. 33 ' In this view, the law is expressively problematic, not on its face, but
in the context of its history and current operation. However, as demonstrated
above, the doctrine's history and its present effects are quite complex.332 If the
language of the defense is neutral, its history is heterodox, and it does not
currently disproportionately exonerate male intimate killers, it is difficult to see
how the doctrine expresses that men are "women 's natural aggressors."333
In addition, provocation critics' reform proposals may compound rather
than suppress provocation law's potential to express gender stereotypes.
Stereotyping, like disparity, is a two-way street. Critics contend that

laws, which prevented "aliens ineligible for citizenship" (namely Asians) from owning land, off
Florida's books).
328. See id. (quoting Sen. Geller, who stated that, despite the Alien Land Law's lack of any real
enforcement, "I authored the legislation because I am opposed to having organized racism in our
constitution.").
329. This scenario is far from fantastical given evidence regarding the relationship between the
hyperpunitive legal regimes and incidences of intimate violence among subordinated people. See
Zanita F. Fenton, Silence Compounded The Conjunction of-Race and Gender Violence, 11 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 271, 282 (2003) (calling domestic violence a "symptom[] of living in a
systematically deprived society that is designed to dominate and control third world people") (quoting
Beth Richie, Battered Black Women: A Challenge for the Black Community, BLACK SCHOLAR,
Mar.-Apr. 1985, at 41); Richard S. Frase, Wat Explains Persistent Racial Disproportionality in
Minnesota'sPrison and JailPopulations?,38 CRIME & JUST. 201, 263 (2009) (discussing the cycle of
poverty and punitive policies).
330. See Berman & Farrell,supra note 32, at 1038 (observing that only two jurisdictions adopt
a categorical approach).
331. See, e.g., Forell, GenderEquality, supra note 25, at 44 (critiquing the commentaries to the
MPC on the ground that they contain "not a hint of concern about its effect on homicides involving
infidelity, separation or domestic violence"); Nourse, supra note 27, at 1334 (asserting that
provocation's normative messages are "disguised-and therefore rendered more powerful and
resistant to change"); id. at 1385 ("In a world in which social norms are changing, not taking a position
becomes a position, one that endorses the status quo even as it denies that it is endorsing anything at
all.").
332. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the doctrine's history); Part IV.B (discussing the
doctrine's effects).
333. HORDER, supra note 15 (emphasis in original).
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provocation law transmits the message that men are naturally aggressive,
especially toward female domestic partners.334 Constructing a legal regime that
recognizes that women also can be violent and men can be nonviolent would be
one way to remedy this expressivist problem.335 This might involve legal
reforms (such as jury instructions) to ensure that jurors are not predisposed to
automatically credit female defendants who claim they were afraid of male
victims or automatically discredit male defendants who say they were afraid of
* * 336

women victims.

These revisions, however, are clearly not the ones sought by feminist
critics of provocation. Rather, critics take pains to portray a picture (one might
say a stereotypical picture) of male intimate killers as violent pattern abusers
and female intimate killers as true victims who are nonviolent by nature and
only resort to aggression after suffering horrific systematic abuse. Those who
advocate for a "reasonable woman" standard assume such reform will
drastically reduce the provocation defense's efficacy because everybody,
including jurors, knows that women do not kill. 337 The anti-stereotyping
argument consequently runs up against the same dilemma as formal equality
arguments.338 It is intellectually incoherent to both maintain a liberal position
that the law can never support stereotypes and, at the same time, hope to
,,339
construct a provocation doctrine situated in the "woman's experience.
2.

ProvocationReform May Not Send an Anti- Violence Message

I left the anti-violence argument for last because it is the most facially
persuasive argument against the provocation doctrine and, thus, seemingly the
most unquestionable and unassailable. Again, no progressive criminal law

334. See supraPart III.D.1.
335. Cynthia Lee has suggested "switching" instructions, whereby a jury is told to imagine a
female defendant as a male and a male defendant as a female in order to reduce the potential for
stereotyping. LEE, supra note 9, at 217-20 & 253-59. Ideally, a jury would then see an adultery-based
killing committed by a woman as "normal." Id. at 218. However, Lee has some trouble when it comes
to battered women who kill. She does not endorse telling the jury to imagine a battered woman as a
man or, indeed, imagine a man who claims to have been beaten as a woman. Id. at 219.
336. Former prosecutor Alafair Burke discusses a self-defense case in which the female
defendant threw boiling tea on her boyfriend and Burke's successful method for countering
stereotypes that favor female self-defense claimants. Burke, supra note 143, at 1074. She states that
"[fjearing that the jury would acquit . . [she] asked [jurors] to imagine that the defendant was a man
yelling at his wife for buying a scarf at Nordstrom they could not afford, then throwing his soup on her
so she would get away from him. The jury convicted after forty minutes of deliberation." Id. at 1074.
337. See FORELL & MATTHEWS, supra note 135, at 172 ("Under our proposed reasonable
woman standard, nothing short of actual or imminent serious bodily harm would be legally adequate
provocation.").
338. See supranotes 289-92 and accompanying text.
339. See Linda Alcoff, Cultural Feminism Versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in
Feminist Theory, 13 SIGNS 405, 408 (1988) (observing that cultural feminists reappropriate female
nature "in an effort to revalidate undervalued female attributes").
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professor desires to write a manifesto in support of violence. 340 Especially to
those sensitive to gender issues, it is quite compelling to argue that laws
condoning violence reflect a male view of the world and propose legal changes
to incorporate a female, nonviolent view of the world.341
However, even one who believes that the law should be constructed to
serve women (or at least not disserve them) might still have issues with a
female-centric, 180-degree reversal of provocation law. When female
nonviolence replaces male aggression as the standard by which defendants are
342
judged, male defendants are not the only sufferers in the change.
Rather,
such a large cultural feminist shift would also sacrifice the interests of female
defendants who do not "kill like a woman" (i.e., do not kill in response to
horrific systematic abuse).343 So how does a critic concerned with gender
account for such women? Some commentators simply ignore them or retell
their stories to fit the feminist trope.344 Another popular tactic condemns such
women for being excessively violent, just like their male counterparts.34 5 In
this way, provocation critics maintain a commitment to women's values even
as they do harm to actual women.
At first blush, this anti-violence stance appears a progressive and pacifist
position supporting a loving and peaceable world free of brutality. There is,
however, good reason to probe carefully the political meaning of anti-violence
and question our culture's unwavering faith in punishment as a means of
achieving social harmony. First, the apparently pacifistic objection to
provocation law actually has a conservative valence. The anti-violence stance
adopts the prosecutorial ideology that exercises of punitive authority are
unquestionably legitimate when done in the name of stamping out private
346
violence.
Moreover, feminists, as critical scholars, should acknowledge the
semiotic aspects anti-violence discourse.347 The legal discourses of violence

340. See Forman, Jr., supra note 192, at 49 ("Since it is especially difficult to suspend moral
judgment when the discussion turns to violent crime, progressives tend to avoid or change the
subject."); Gruber, Murder, supra note 32, at 155 (stating that "even in liberal criminal law discourse,
critiques of the American penal state and mass incarceration tend to fade in the face of truly violent
defendant behavior").
341. See, e.g., ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 277-78 (1997) (advocating an ethic of care
to "ultimately form the foundation of a feminist, maternalist (and humanist) moral theory").
342. See supra notes 310-12 and accompanying text.
343. See Taylor, supra note 77, at 1734 (noting the idea 'that all women who kill are battered
by their male victims and kill in terror . .. would doom those [women] who do not fit any of the above
molds by labeling their reactions 'unreasonable').
344. See MacKinnon, Jurisprudence, supra note 285, at 714-17 (critiquing ANN JONES,
WOMEN WHO KLL (2009), for assuming the lesser culpability of all women killers).
345. See, e.g., Forell, Homicide, supra note 128, at 617 (asserting that the law should "make[] it
clear that infidelity is almost never an adequate excuse for killing regardless of the genders of the
parties").
346. See supra note 243.

347. See Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Critique, 22 CARDozo L. REv. 1147, 1147, 1175-83
(2001) (discussing the "theory langue" of critical legal studies).
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have meaning in context and, in turn, give meaning to other specific contexts.
Violence does not exist in a vacuum as some immutable thing in itself-its
meaning is contingent and ideologically driven. 348 Anti-violence dialogue
operates within a political dynamic where multiple interest groups with
different amounts of power invoke the discourse for a variety of goals.349 In
criminal law discourse, the prevention or punishment of violence is not
synonymous with reducing any harm produced by any actor (individual or
institutional). Addressing violence means a very particular thing.
The violence that merits criminal law intervention excludes entire
categories of brutality and suffering. For the most part, it does not include
governmental violence. 350 The routine violence committed by prison officials
in their regular management of prisoners, by police officers in their everyday
interactions with citizens on the street, and even by school officials in their
administration of institutional disciplinary policies not only enjoys complete
immunity from governmental intervention, but also active encouragement. 35
Even when the violence of these institutional actors crosses some opaque line
352
into "excessive force," the criminal law often fails to intervene.
Regarding
state actors, modem American criminal law inversely shifts the presumption
against aggression. Whereas private individual violence is indisputably an evil
that must be stamped out by any means, state violence is presumptively
legitimate and necessary. 353 "Thus, violence within modemity is usually

.

348. See Ristroph, supra note 187, at 575 (asserting that the discourse of violence does not
"disentangle understandable concern for bodily safety from irrational fear, prejudice, or thoughtless
punitiveness").
349. For example, media executives and politicians have deftly managed a dialogue of black
violence to further their goals. See David Cohen, Book Note, Democracy and the Intersection of
Prisons, Racism and Capital, 15 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 87, 88 (1998) (reviewing David Oshinsky,
"WORSE THAN SLAVERY": PARCHMAN FARM AND THE ORDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTICE (1996))
("The rhetorical driving force behind [the latter twentieth century] increase in incarceration is the 'war
on crime,' and in this so-called war, the enemy is the faceless, nameless, identity-less African
American man doing violence to white society."). Anti-violence discourse may support other interest
groups, such as security companies and land developers. Cf Jonathan Simon, Crime, Community, and
Criminal Justice, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1415, 1417 (2002) (linking increased securitization to "sprawl,
traffic congestion, desertion of public spaces and institutions, and a national epidemic in childhood
obesity").
350. See Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and CriminalJustice, 52 STAN. L
REV. 777, 799 (2000) (internal quotations omitted) ("In liberal democracies, the exercise of state
violence, both in the domestic realm and in foreign relations, is justified by reference to the values of
protection, security, and order.").
351. See Erwin Chemerinsky, An Independent Analysis of the Los Angeles Police Department's
Board of Inquiry Report on the Rampart Scandal, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 545, 559-75 (2001)
(documenting the culture of aggression and violence in the LAPD). See generally Barbara E.
Armacost, OrganizationalCultureand Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453 (2004).
352. See John V. Jacobi, ProsecutingPolice Misconduct, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 789, 797 (2000)
(noting the "apparent impunity with which serious police violence is meted out" and citing examples).
353. David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence be Contained?, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 465, 467 (1992) ("Frustration with disorder and crime in turn leads to a public acceptance of
extra-constitutional police practices. Because police abuse is most often directed against those without
political power or social status, their complaints are often dismissed or ignored.").
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becomes a protector from violence, not the perpetrator of violence; and,
violence that the state does commit is veiled in legitimacy." 35 4
Violence proscribed by the criminal law also excludes the harms
committed by powerful non-state actors. Today, environmental justice scholars
use the term "slow violence" to describe the type of suffering that moneyed and
corporate interests impose upon the world's poor invisibly, tolerably, and
across time. 355 Rob Nixon explains:
By slow violence I mean a violence that occurs gradually and out of
sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time
and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as
violence at all. Violence is customarily conceived as an event or action
that is immediate in time, explosive and spectacular in space, and as
erupting into instant sensational visibility. We need, I believe, to
engage a different kind of violence, a violence that is neither
spectacular nor instantaneous, but rather incremental and accretive, its
calamitous repercussions playing out across a range of temporal
scales.356
Relatedly, racial scholars talk about the "slow death" of people of color
and other members of the underclass from institutional and societal racism and
classism.

35 7

Far from being the solution to the slow death or "spirit murder" 358

of the underprivileged, American criminal justice tends to be an aider and
abettor of this form of violence. 35 9 Consequently, anti-violence criminal law
discourse defines a bounded space for policeable violence, thereby erasing
other forms of harm, namely those produced by powerful interests, from public
consciousness, political language, and legal doctrine. In this way, overattention

354.

Peter Jacques et al., FederalIndian Law and EnvironmentalPolicy: A Social Continuity

of Violence, 18 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 223, 226 (2003).
355.

See generally ROB NIXON, SLOW VIOLENCE AND THE ENVIRONMENTALISM OF THE

POOR (2011).
356. Id.at2.
357. See, e.g., Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of
Fingerpointingas the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 129 (1987) ("Society is
only beginning to recognize that racism is as devastating, as costly, and as psychically obliterating as
robbery or assault; indeed they are often the same."); Adrien Katherine Wing & Monica Nigh Smith,
Critical Race Feminism Lifts the Veil?: Muslim Women, France, and the HeadscarfBan, 39 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 743, 777 (2006) ("Racism, sexism, and other forms of discrimination can lead to the
slow death of a person's soul or psyche.").
358. See WILLIAMS, supra note 357.
359. See Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and Social Control: The
Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 173, 228 (2008) (citing
multiple studies demonstrating that U.S. criminal justice tears apart minority communities, disrupts
informal social controls, and ultimately has a "perverse escalatory effect[]"; Dorothy F. Roberts, The
Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarcerationin African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV.

1271, 1298-99 (2004).
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to "fast violence" helps perpetuate slow violence.360 Thus, provocation critics'
well-founded concerns about women's suffering translate solely into proposals
to increase the policing of bad men rather than reforms that challenge the
institutional, economic, and structural inequality that makes some women
vulnerable to "fast" violence and harms other women in a variety of ways.
In addition to rendering the violence done to subaltems invisible, antiviolence criminal law discourse creates a presumption within the public psyche
that authoritarian state intervention into the lives of the underclass (especially
poor men of color) is prima facie justified.3 6' While the harms produced by
powerful government and corporate interests are all but totally excluded from
the concept of violence, the language of violence proves remarkably adaptable
in describing harms that are produced by poor minorities. Violent crimes
include far more than intentional homicides and beatings. Crack cocaine is an
362
363
epidemic of violence.
Gang membership is inherently violent.
Drug
364
addicted pregnant women commit violence against their fetuses.
Criminal
law's campaign to end violence really boils down to the hyper-policing of the
type of harms caused by the most unfortunate (and thus arguably least
365
culpable) among us.
One might respond to the above objections by asserting that the criminal
law should punish both the slow violence perpetrated by powerful institutional
actors and the fast violence that occurs in blighted communities. After all, the

360. See NIXON, supra note 355, at 4 ("Our media bias toward spectacular violence exacerbates
the vulnerability of ecosystems treated as disposable by turbo-capitalism while simultaneously
exacerbating the vulnerability of. . . disposable people.") (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted) (quoting KEVIN BALE, DISPOSABLE PEOPLE: NEw SLAVERY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
(2004)).
361. See supranote 239 (discussing studies on the racialized nature of violence).
362. Richard C. Boldt, Drug Policy in Context: Rhetoric and Practice in the United States and
the UnitedKingdom, 62 S.C. L. REV. 261, 301 (2011) (observing that the "war on drugs" in the 1980s
was fueled by "the news media's preoccupation with crack cocaine and the resulting public perception
that the use of crack had significantly increased the level of street violence and social disorder in
American cities").
363. See Beth Caldwell & Ellen C. Caldwell, "Superpredators"and "Animals" Images and
California's "Get Tough on Crime" Initiatives, 2011 J. INST. JUST. & INT'L STUD. 61, 66 (2011)
("Influenced by exaggerated media reports about rising gang violence and the popularized image of
juvenile 'superpredators,' California voters approved the Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime
Prevention Act ('Proposition 21') in 2000 that made the state's juvenile justice system markedly more
punitive."); see also supranote 238 (discussing Clinton's statement on gang member victims).
364. Krista Stone-Manista, ProtectingPregnant Women: A Guide to Successfully Challenging
Criminal Child Abuse Prosecutionsof PregnantDrugAddicts, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 823,
824 (2009) ("Prosecutors bring criminal charges against pregnant women who use illicit drugs under a
wide range of state statutes, including but not limited to those governing criminal child abuse, criminal
child mistreatment, and attempted first-degree intentional homicide.") (footnotes omitted).
365. Bernard E. Harcourt makes a similar argument about the discourse of harm. See supra note
174, at 167-68 ("Claims of non-trivial harm have become so pervasive in political debate that the
harm principle . . no longer really excludes much conduct from the ambit of the criminal law."); see
also Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109
(1999).
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victims of underclass violence are likely to be members of the underclass
themselves.366 However, the anti-violence justification of criminal law goes
beyond punishment for uncontrovertibly harmful behavior. As Alice Ristroph
insightfully observes, a great "innovation in the concept of violence, as far as
criminal law is concerned, is a contemporary shift from threat to risk. This shift
has occurred most noticeably in sentencing law, and it is helping fuel the vast
expansion of the U.S. prison population." 367 Moreover, anti-violence policing
can be openly instrumental. The state often justifies brutal police intervention
against political protestors, labor organizers, and other grassroots activists by
368
reference to curbing violence.
In the end, then, criminal laws purportedly
executed in the name of pacifism may not reduce violence overall but simply
give a monopoly on violence to the state. Jacques Derrida notes:
At its most fundamental level . . . law tends to prohibit individual

violence and to condemn it not because it poses a threat to this or that
law but because it threatens the judicial order itself. . . . [I]t is in the
nature of its own interest, to pretend to exclude any individual violence
threatening its order and thus to monopolize violence .... Law has an
"interest in a monopoly of violence." This monopoly does not strive to
protect any given just and legal ends but law itself.3 9
Although feminists and race scholars are highly critical of systemic
oppression, hidden hierarchies, and the pervasive influence of hegemonic
norms, they nonetheless often retain fidelity to the criminal system when faced
with sexual and racialized private violence. As this Article is being written,
progressives throughout the nation continue to call for the narrowing of selfdefense laws in the wake of George Zimmerman's acquittal.370 In fact, the
Trayvon Martin case highlights the problematic nature of modem American
society's hysterical fear of crime and use of race as a heuristic for

366. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 19 (1997) (asserting that "the
principal injury suffered by African Americans in relation to criminal matters is not overenforcement
but underenforcement").
367. Ristroph, supra note 187, at 603 (emphasis in original).
368. See Ahmed A. White, IndustrialTerrorism and the Unmaking ofNew Deal LaborLaw, 11
NEv. L.J. 561, 562-63 (2011) (From the late 1870s until at least the late 1930s "employers first
provoked workers to violence by denying them basic labor rights and then used this pretense to justify
attacks on them. Indeed, employers could regularly expect the state to abet their use of force against
unionists, however contrived the pretext or culpable the employer.").
369. JACQUES DERRIDA, Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation ofAuthority," in ACTS OF
RELIGION 230, 266-67 (2002).
370. See Kyle Hightower & Mike Schneider, Jury Acquits Zimmerman of Second-Degree
Murder, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 13, 2013, 10:08 PM), available at http://www.blueridgenow.com/
article/20130713/ARTICLES/130719897 ("Defense attorneys said the case was classic self-defense,
claiming Martin knocked Zimmerman down and was slamming the older man's head against the
concrete sidewalk when Zimmerman fired his gun."); Nick Wing, Alan Williams, FloridaDemocrat,
Will Push 'Stand Your Ground'Repeal After Zimmerman Verdict, HUFFINGTON POST (July 15, 2013,
12:04 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/15/alan-williams-stand-your-ground n 3598
833.html (noting that the acquittal "brought newfound scrutiny on the [stand your ground] law").
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criminality. 37' Nevertheless, many pay more attention to the leniency of
Florida's self-defense law than the narratives of race and criminality that led
Zimmerman to profile Martin and influenced jurors to buy Zimmerman's story
wholesale, which made him not guilty under any version of self-defense law.372
It is not leniency that creates racialized visions of criminality. Rather, they
reflect and reinforce our hyper-policing, hyper-punitive culture.373 The tragic
Michael Brown shooting and ensuing events in Ferguson starkly illustrate the
problem of relying on police and prosecution to counter violence, especially
violence in minority communities.374 For several decades, politicians,
lawmakers, and the media have portrayed certain areas, specifically lowincome minority neighborhoods, as sites of rampant violence and social
disarray akin to "war zones."

375

This narrative has undergirded some of the

most condemnable practices of modem policing, including race-based stops,
376
hyper-surveillance, and the use of military weaponry and tactics.
Often,
those controlling the policing and prosecution of violence in these
neighborhoods are socioeconomically and racially distinct from the occupants,
377
who experience de jure and de facto disenfranchisement.
Accordingly, many

371. See supranote 239.
372. See Wing, supra note 370 (observing that Zimmerman's defense "ultimately didn't use
'Stand Your Ground' during the court proceedings").
373. Ted Chiricos et al., Racial Typification of Crime and Supportfor Punitive Measures, 42
CRIINOLOGY 359 (2004) (study finding correlation between racial typification of crime and support
for punitive measures).
374. See generally Huff Post: Michael Brown, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffington
post.com/news/michael-brown/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2015) (online portal on the Michael Brown case
and Ferguson protests).
375. See, e.g., Jim Atkinson, In the War Zone, TEX. MONTHLY, Nov. 1988, available at
http://www.maryellenmark.com/text/magazines/texas%/`20monthly/905G-000-0 11 .html
("Vicious
Jamaican crack dealers have turned a working-class neighborhood into occupied territory."); Ronald
W. Reagan, President of the U.S., Remarks at the Annual Conference of the National Sheriffs
Association in Hartford, Connecticut (June 20, 1984), available at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/
archives/speeches/1984/62084c.htm) ("Th[e] rise in crime, caused by a hardened criminal class, was
fostered partly from a liberal social philosophy that too often called for lenient treatment of
criminals."). For a more modern version of this characterization, see Nolan Peterson, Chicago's
Murder Rate Mirrors War Zone, FederalData Shows, FoxNEwS.COM, http://nation.foxnews.com/
chicago/2012/05/31/chicagos-murder-rate-mirrors-war-zone-federal-data-shows (last visited Jan. 7,
2015) (discussing Chicago murder rate in "hot zones" and endorsing New York's targeted
neighborhood policing, which is credited with "reduc[ing] overall crime rates in New York by 80
percent in the 1990s"). See generally Markus Dirk Dubber, PolicingPossession: The War on Crime
and the End ofCriminalLaw, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829 (2001).
376. See generally Kimberly D. Bailey, Watching Me: The War on Crime, Privacy, and the
State, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1539 (2014); Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus
Criminality: Or Why the "War on Drugs" was a "War on Blacks", 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 381
(2002).
377. See Peter Dreier & Todd Swanstrom, Suburban Ghettos Like Ferguson are Ticking Time
Bombs, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/08/21/
suburban-ghettos-like-ferguson-are-ticking-time-bombs/;
Sean McElwee, Black People, White
Government, AL JAZEERA AM. (Oct. 30, 2014, 2:00 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/
1 0/ferguson-africanamericanspoliticalrepresentation.html.
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minorities have little faith in the criminal system's ability to meaningfully
protect marginalized groups from violence. For example, queer and
transgendered legal theorists have become wary of calling for more criminal
enforcement in the face of widespread violence against LGBTQ individuals. As
Dean Spade notes, "Many queer and trans people are increasingly critical of
criminalization and immigration enforcement, and are unsatisfied by the idea
that the answer to the violence we experience is harsher criminal laws or more
police."

378

Thus,

race

theorist's

commentary

in the

Zimmerman

case

paradoxically evidences amnesia about the racial injustice of the criminal
system and support for the very policemen and prosecutors criticized as racially
biased. Similarly, provocation critics strangely hope to send a message of
feminine passivity through increasing the reach of the U.S. penal system-a
system described as the embodiment of male "hierarchical rule and coercive
authority" by bell hooks, a noted feminist system author.379
Feminists hope to counter masculine norms by using police power to
stamp out individual men's fast violence. However, broadening state criminal
authority may bolster rather than curtail destructive masculine power. First, it
confirms and legitimizes the problematic distinction between the celebrated
masculinity of white powerful men and the disparaged masculinity ascribed to
underprivileged men of color. Angela Harris explains:
[W]hite heterosexual middle- and upper-class men who occupy ordergiving positions in the institutions they control-particularly
economic, political, and military institutions-produce a hegemonic
masculinity that is glorified throughout the culture.... African
American men have been stereotyped ... as violent, unable to control
their physical and sexual urges, and unintelligent. This latter set of
stereotypes allows white men to see themselves as superior: Though
African American men may possess a brutish maleness, they are
lacking in the mental and moral qualities that are necessary for
"civilized" men: gentlemen, patriarchs, rulers.380
Second, feminist efforts to control fast violence expand the reach of the
criminal system-a repository of hyper-masculinity that critics characterize as
"a primary location of racist, sexist, homophobic, and class-biased oppression
in this country" 381' and a system designed "to perpetuate and replicate existing

378. Dean Spade, Their Laws Will Never Make Us Safer, in AGAINST EQUALITY: PRISONS
WILL NOT PROTECT YOU 1, 7-8 (Ryan Conrad ed., 2012).
379. HOOKS, supra note 269, at 118. For my views on this case, see generally Aya Gruber,
Race to Incarcerate:Punitive Impulse and the Bid to Repeal Stand Your Ground, 68 U. MIAMI L.

REV. 961 (2014).
380. Harris, supra note 350, at 783-84 (internal quotations omitted).
381. Mari J. Matsuda, Crime and Affrmative Action, 1 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 309, 319

(1998).
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power relations."3 82 To be sure, such critiques of the American penal state and
mass incarceration are abundant in the criminal law literature.3 83
Nonetheless, provocation critics might argue that one can simultaneously
address excessive imprisonment by reducing sentences generally and seek
symbolic condemnation of masculine violence by narrowing the provocation
defense.384 However, the call for greater penal severity in the wake of crimes
against women may have a greater connection to mass incarceration than
provocation critics realize. Certainly, theories abound regarding how the
United States became the most punitive Western nation on Earth. From
demographic shifts and the demise of community solidarity 38 5 to retributive
386
rhetoric and victims' rights,
scholars have amply theorized American-style
penality. Some commentators, including this author, have argued that proincarceration shifts in U.S. penal policy emanated in part from the
387
transcendence of neoliberal political ideology in the latter twentieth century.38
Popular political rhetoric ascribed social problems to the actions of individual
pathological actors and prescribed criminal law as the obvious remedy to such
388
problems.
Modern U.S. political discourse thus makes natural, invisible, and
382. Dianne L. Martin, Retribution Revisited: A Reconsideration of Feminist Criminal Law
Reform Strategies,36 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 151, 153 (1998).
383. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JRM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); PAUL BUTLER, LET'S GET FREE: A HIP-HoP THEORY OF JUSTICE

23-40 (2008) (problematizing mass incarceration); infra notes 385-86 and accompanying text; see also
Gruber, Murder, supra note 32, at 171 ("Today, the liberal critique of mass incarceration and the
American penal state, an institutional critique, is well-trodden academic territory."); Andrew E.
Taslitz, The CriminalRepublic: Democratic Breakdown as a Cause of Mass Incarceration,9 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 133, 133-34 (2011) (observing that "mass incarceration" describes the "explosion of
Americans' reliance on imprisonment").

384. See supranote 263.
385. See DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN

CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 85 (2001) (linking the United States' punitive turn to the balkanization of
black neighborhoods); WILLIAM J. STuNTz, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 31

(2011) (discussing the shift from localized policing to a "more centralized, more legalized, more
bureaucratized" justice system in the twenty-first century as a possible explanation for the system's
increased severity).
386. See supranote 244 (discussing the victims' rights movement).
387. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: PUNISHMENT AND THE

MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER 202-03 (2011) (asserting that the American penal state has "been
facilitated by . .. the rationality of neoliberal penality: by, on the one hand, the assumption of
government legitimacy and competence in the penal arena and, on the other hand, the presumption that
the government should not play a role elsewhere"); LOIC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE
NEOLBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY 297 (2009) ("[T]he widening of the penal

dragnet under neoliberalism has been remarkably discriminating: . . [I]t has affected essentially the
denizens of the lower regions of social and physical space."); Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the
War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 618-19 (2009) [hereinafter Rape] ("The tough-on-crime
philosophy that overtook America was not a singular phenomenon, divorced from a larger political
and economic program, but a distinct part of a neoliberal paradigm of rampant individualism,
minimization of government services, and unconstrained capitalism.") (footnotes omitted).
388. See, e.g., Reagan, supra note 375 ("Individual wrongdoing, [liberals] told us, was always
caused by a lack of material goods, and underprivileged background, or poor socioeconomic
conditions.... Somehow, it wasn't the wrongdoer but all of us who were to blame. Is it any wonder,
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pre-political the correlation of social problems with penal solutions.389 Today,
people all over the political spectrum jump to criminal law resolutions when
faced with individuals who commit whatever is "true" harm in their eyes, thus
perpetuating the ascendency of criminal law as a primary governance
structure.390 Critical theorists are the group of commentators that typically
problematize and analyze the distributional impacts of state penal policies.
When that group seeks to remedy its identified injustices through more
criminal law, it gives an air of undeniable legitimacy to the notion that social
problems are solely the products of individual deviant actors who must be
punished or deterred.
CONCLUSION
For decades, scholars concerned with gender equality have asserted that
liberal versions of the provocation doctrine unwittingly aid and abet the violent
subordination of women. This Article has taken a critical look at the feminist
critique of provocation and uncovered the ways in which it may unwittingly aid
and abet the discourses that naturalize governmental authoritarianism, bolster
the penal state, contribute to mass incarceration, and undermine women's
formal equality under the law. Given that the history of provocation is at least
in part related to women's subordination, it is fully understandable, and
commendable, that feminists have endeavored to understand the doctrine's
connection to social inequality. Nevertheless, when one takes a step back and
divorces provocation analysis from feminist dogma, it turns out that the
feminist critique may simply be a collection of solutions in search of a
problem. The defense does not necessarily burden women unfairly nor does it
particularly privilege sexist men. Women's status as presumed victims rather
than culpable wrongdoers largely protects them from the penal state even in
this era of hyper-incarceration. Men's, especially minority men's, status as
presumed criminals makes it difficult for them to exploit any lenient criminal
law principle, including provocation.
It is also laudable that feminists hope to shape a criminal law that
embodies values of gender equality and nonviolence. However, equality is a
moving target that can be invoked to support various normative goals. If
feminists are truly committed to reducing hierarchy and subordination, they
should reevaluate whether pursuing the opaque mantle of equality through
greater penal severity actually does so. Moreover, the commitment to

then, that a new privileged class emerged in America, a class of repeat offenders and career criminals
who thought they had the right to victimize their fellow citizens with impunity.").
389. See Gruber, Rape, supra note, 387, at 620-21 ("The image of the entirely culpable and
irredeemable criminal allowed society to feel comfortable with ever harsher punishments while
denying any responsibility for the root causes of crime.").
390. See Jonathan Simon, From a Tight Place: Crime, Punishment, and American Liberalism,
17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 853, 854 (1999) (asserting that crime control was one of the few
government actions Presidents Bush and Reagan found defensible under their political ideology).
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nonviolence, while unquestionably noble in theory, does not necessarily lead to
a world with less suffering. In fact, police, prosecutors, and politicians' efforts
to control private violence through the criminal law have arguably constructed
a world of acceptable, if not glorified, institutional violence. It is thus time to
take a critical look at what the discourse of "violence hath wrought." 391 More
importantly, I hope that this Article is part of a larger conversation encouraging
progressives-including feminists, humanitarians, and critical race theoriststo be more circumspect about prosecutorial solutions to gendered harms and
392
racialized violence.
The link between social problems and criminal law
solutions is not natural, obvious, or required. It is the product of a larger
neoliberal framework that has predicated the decimation of social welfare and
our current excess of imprisonment.
Today, some experts opine that we may now be "turning the comer on
mass incarceration." 393 Indeed, economic conditions, the costs of policing and
prosecution, social tolerance for drugs, and the institutional demands of largescale imprisonment are causing some to attenuate the link between social ills
and the need for criminal punishment.394 Consequently, in this watershed time,
it is particularly important for progressives to resist the temptation to prescribe
punishment as the primary solution to sexist or racist harms, not because such
harms are acceptable, but because increased punitivity exacerbates problems of
hierarchy and, in the end, fuels the carceral juggernaut.

391. Ristroph, supra note 187, at 610.
392. Marie Gottschalk remarks, "[F]eminists need to develop and reaffirm a feminist vision of
justice that incorporates some of the key insights of critical criminology, embracing its deep
skepticism of expanding the law enforcement powers of the state to deal with social problems."
Dismantling the CarceralState: The Future of Penal Policy Reform, 84 TEx. L. REV. 1693, 1726
(2006).
393. David Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass incarceration?,9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 27, 27

(2011).
394. See id. at 34-39.
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